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This paper considers the problem of policy evaluation in a modern society with heterogeneous
agents and diverse groups with conflicting interests.  Several different approaches to the policy evaluation
problem are compared including the approach adopted in modern welfare economics, the classical
representative agent approach adopted in macroecononomics and the microeconomic treatment effect
approach. A new approach to the policy evaluation problem is developed and applied that combines and
extends the best features of these earlier approaches.Evidence on the importance of heterogeneity is
presented. Using an empirically based  dynamic general equilibrium model of skill formation with
heterogeneous agents, the benefits of  the more comprehensive approach to policy evaluation are examined
in the context of examining the impact of tax reform on skill formation and the political economy aspects




1126 E 59th Street 
Chicago, IL  60637 
and NBER
jjh@uchicago.eduIntroduction
Coercive redistribution and diversity in the interests of its constituent groups are essential
features of the modern welfare state. Disagreement over perceived consequences of social policy
creates the demand for publically justified "objective" evaluations. If there were no coercion,
redistribution and intervention would be voluntary activities and there would be no need for public
justification of voluntary trades. The demand for publically documented objective evaluations of
social programs arises in large part from a demand for information by rival parties in the democratic
welfare state.' Since different outcomes are of interest to rival parties, a variety of criteria should
be used when considering the full consequences of proposed policies. This paper examines these
criteria and considers the information required to implement them.
Given that heterogeneity and diversity are central to the modern state, it is surprising that
the methods most commonly used for evaluating its policies do not recognize these features. The
textbook econometric policy evaluation model, due to Tinbergen (1956), Theil (1961), and Lucas
(1987), constructs a social welfare function for a representative agent to evaluate the consequences
of alternative social policies. In this approach to economic policy evaluation, the general equi-
librium effects and efficiency aspects of a policy are its important features. Heterogeneity across
persons in preferences and policy outcomes are treated as second order problems and estimates of
'Indeed, as discussed by Porter (1995), the very definition of "objective" standards is often the topic of intense
political debate. See also the discussion in Young (1994).
1policy effects are based on macro time series per capita aggregates.
Standard cost-benefit analysis ignores both distributional and general-equilibrim-naspects of
a policy and enmnerates aggregate costs and Lenefits at fixed prices. Harberger's paraphrase of
Gertrude Stein that a dollar is a dollar is a dollar" succinctly summarizes the essential features
of his approach (Harberger, 1971). Attempts to incorporate distributional "welfareweights" into
cost-benefit analysis (Harberger, 1978) have an ad hoc and unsystematic character about them.
In practice, these analyses usually reflect the personal preferences of the individuals conducting
particular evaluations.
Access to microdata facilitates the estimation of the distributional consequences of alternative
policies. Yet surprisingly, the empirical micro literature focuses almost exclusively on estimating
mean impacts for specific demographic groups and estimates heterogeneity in program impacts
only across demographic groups. It neglects heterogeneity in responses within narrowly defined
demographic categories -variationshown to be empirically important both in the literature and
in the empirical analysis I present below.
Microdata are no panacea, however, and they must be used in conjunction with aggregate
time-series data to estimate the full general-equilibrium consequences of policies. Even abstracting
from general-equilibrium considerations, the estimates produced from social experiments and the
microeconometric "treatment effect" literature are not those required to conduct a proper cost-
benefit analysis, anless agents with identical observed characteristics respond identically to the
2policy being evaluated; or if they do not, their participation in the program being evaluated must
not depend on differences across agents in gains from the program. The estimates produced from
social experiments and the treatment effect literature improve on aggregate time series methods
by incorporating heterogeneity in responses to the policies in terms of observed characteristics
but ignore heterogeneity in unobserved characteristics, an essential feature of the microdata from
program evaluations.
Unlike the macro-general-equilibrium literature, the literature on modern welfare economics
(see. e.g., Sen, 1973) recognizes the diversity of outcomes produced under alternative policies
but adopts a rigid posture about how the alternatives should be evaluated, invoking some form
of "Veil of Ignorance" assumption as the "ethically correct" point of view. Initial positions are
treated as arbitrary and redistribution is assumed to be costless. The political feasibility of a
criterion is treated as a subsidiary empirical detail that should not intrude upon an "ethically
correct" or "moral" analysis. In this strand of the literature, it is not uncommon to have the work
of "contemporary philosophers" invoked as a source of final authority (see, e.g. Roemer, 1996),
although the philosophers cited never consider the incentive effects of their "moral" positionsand
ignore the political feasibility of their criteria in a modern democratic welfare statewhere people
vote on positions in partial knowledge of the consequences of policies on their personal outcomes.
As noted by Jeremy Bentham (1824), appeal to authority is the lowest form of argument. Thus
the appeal to philosophical authority by many economists on matters of "correct distributional
3criteria" is both surprising and disappointing.
In this essay, I question this criterion. Its anonymity postulates do not describe actual social
decision making in which individuals evaluate oliies by asking whether they (or groups they are
concerned about) are better off compared to a benchmark position.2 Agents know, or forecast,
their positions in the distributions of outcomes under alternative policies and base their evaluations
of the policies on them. From an initial base policy state, persons can at least partially predict
their positions in the outcome distributions of alternative policy states. I improve on modern
welfare theory by incorporating the evaluation of position-dependent outcomes into it, linking the
outcomes under one policy regime to those in another. Such position-dependent outcomes are of
interest to the individuals affected by the policies, to their representatives and to other parties in
the democratic process.
In order to make my discussion specific and useful, I consider the evaluation of human capital
policies for schooling and job training. Human capital is the largest form of investment in a
modern economy. Human capital involves choices at the extensive margin (schooling) and at
the intensive margin (hours of job training). Differences in ability are documented to affect the
outcomes of human capital decisions in important ways. The representative-agent macro-general-
equilibrium paradigm is poorly suited to accommodate these features; the cost-benefit approach
ignores the distributional consequences of alternative human capital policies; and the approach
2Recall Ronald Reagan's devastating rhetorical question in the 1980 campaign: "Are you better off today than
you were four years ago?".
4taken in modern welfare economics denies that it is interesting to determine how policies affect
movements of individuals across the outcome distributions of alternative policy states.
Using both micro-and macrodata, I establish the empirical importance of heterogeneity in the
outcomes of human capital policies even conditioning on detailed individual and group charac-
teristics. Using data from a social experiment evaluating a prototypical job training program, I
compare evaluations under the different criteria. Theoretically important distinctions turn out to
be empirically important as well and produce different descriptions of the same policy.
I present an approach to policy evaluation that unites the macro-general-equilibrium approach
with the approach taken in modern welfare economics. Using an empirically based general-
equilibrium model that combines micro-and macrodata, I examine the distributional consequences
of various tax and tuition policies. I present evidence on the misleading nature of the micro ev-
idence produced from social experiments and the microeconomic treatment effect literature, and
the incomplete character of the representative agent calculations that ignore distributional con-
siderations entirely.
The plan of this paper is as follows. I first present alternative criteria that have been proposed to
evaluate social programs and consider their limitations. I propose a position-dependent criterion
to evaluate policies. I then consider the information requirements of the various criteria. Not
surprisingly, the more interesting criteria are also more demanding in their requirements. I consider
the consequences of heterogeneity in responses to policies by agents for the success of various
5social experiment with what is required to perform a cost-benefit analysis. There isa surprising
disconnect between the two approaches when agents respond differently to the sameprogram.
I go on to consider the evidence on heterogeneity in program impacts acrosspersons, using data
from a protypical job training program. I use a variety of criteria to evaluate the sameprogram, in-
cluding revealed preference and self-assessment data and second-order stochastic-dominance com-
parisons as suggested by modern welfare economics. There is a surprisingly wide discrepancy
among these alternative evaluation measures.
I then present an empirically based dynamic overlapping-generations general-equilibrium model
fit on both micro-and macrodata that extends the pioneering analysis of Auerbach and Kotlikoff
(1987) on intergenerational accounting to include human capital formation and heterogeneity in
human ability. These extensions produce a framework that accounts for risingwage inequality
and that can be used to evaluate alternative tax and tuition policies, including their distributional
impacts. The estimates produced from the general-equilibrium framework are contrasted with
those obtained from the widely used social experiment and treatment effect approaches. The
contrasts are found to be substantial, casting doubt on the value of conventional methods that are
6used to evaluate human capital policies.
I. Alternative Criteria fo Eyaluating Social Programs
In this section, I consider alternative criteria that have been set forth in the literature to
examine the desireability of alternative policies. Define the outcome for person i in the presence
of policy j to be Y and let the personal preferences of person i for outcome vector Y be denoted
U1(Y). A policy effects a redistribution from taxpayers to beneficiaries, and Y represents the flow
of resources to i under policy j. Persons can be both beneficiaries and tax payers. All policies
considered in this paper are assumed to be feasible.
In the simplest case, Y32 is net income after tax and transfers, but it may also be a vector of
incomes and benefits, including provisions of in-kind services. Many criteria have been proposed
to evaluate policies. Let "0" denote the no-policy state and initially abstract from uncertainty.
The standard model of welfare economics postniates a social welfare function W that is defined
over the utilities of the N members of society:
(I-i) 47(j) =l47(U1(Y1),...,UN(Y3N)).
In the standard macroeconomic policy evaluation problem (I-i) is collapsed further to consider the
welfare of a single person, the representative agent. Policy choice based on a social welfare function
picks that policy jwiththe highest value for W(j). A leading special case is the Benthamite social
welfare function:
7(1-2) B(j)=
Criteria(I-i) and (1-2) implictly assume that social preferences are defined in terms of the private
preferences of citizens as expressed in terms of their own consumption. (This principle is called
welfarism. See Sen, 1979.) They could be extended to allow for interdependence across persons
so that the utility of person i under policy jisU(Y31,..., Yv)for all i.
Conventional cost-benefit analysis assumes that YF is scalar income and orders policies by their
contribution to aggregate income:
(1-3) CB(j)=.
Analystswho adopt criterion (1-3) implicitly assume either that outputs can be costlessly redis-
tributed among persons via a social welfare function, or else accept GNP as their measure of value
for a policy.
While these criteria are traditional, they are not universally accepted and do not answer all of
the interesting questions of political economy or "social justice" that arise in the political arena
of the welfare state. In a democratic society, politicians and advocacy groups are interested in
knowing the proportion of people who benefit from policy jascompared to policy k:
(1-4) PB(j jj, k) = 1(U()) > U(Y)),
where "1" is the indicator function: 1(A) =1if A is true; 1(A) =0otherwise. In the median
voter model, a necessary condition for j to be preferred to k is that PB(j j,k)￿1/2.Other
persons concerned about "social justice" are concerned about the plight of the poor as measured
8in some base state k. For them, the gain from policy jismeasured in terms of the income or
utility gains of the poor. In this case, interest centers on the gains to specific types of persons,
e.g.. the gains to persons with outcomes in thebae state k less than y: jkz= — YkiIYkz
or their distribution
(1-5) F(zkIYk =Yk,Yk
orthe utility equivalents of these variables. Within a targeted subpopulation, there is sometimes
interest in knowing the proportion of people who gain relative to specified values of the base state
k:
(1-6) Pr (jk>OYk y).
In addition, measures (1-2) and (1-3) are often defined only for a target population and not the
full taxpayer population.
The existence of merit goods like education or health implies that specific components of the
vector 'jareof interest to certain groups. Many policies are paternalistic in nature and implicitly
assume that people make the wrong choices. "Social" values are placed on specific outcomes, often
stated in terms of thresholds. Thus one group may care about another group in terms of whether
it satisfies an absolute threshold requirement:
Y￿Y foriES,
where S is a target set toward which the policy is directed, or in terms of a relative requirement
compared to a base state k:
9for iS.
Uncertainty introduces important additional qonsiderations. Participants in society typically
do not know the consequences of each policy for each person, or for themselves, and do not
know possible states not yet experienced. A fundamental limitation in applying the criteria just
exposited is that, ex ante, these consequences are not known and, ex post, one may not observe
all potential outcomes for all persons. If some potential states are not experienced, the best that
agents can do is to guess about them. Even if, ex post, agents know their outcome in a benchmark
state, they may not know it ex ante, and they may always be uncertain about what they would
have experienced in an alternative state.
In the literature on welfare economics and social choice, one form of decision-making under
uncertainty plays a central role. The "Veil of Ignorance" of Vickrey (1945, 1961) and Harsanyi
(1955. 1975) postulates that decision makers are completely uncertain about their positions in
the distribution of outcomes under each policy, or shotild act as if they are completely uncertain,
and they should use expected utility criteria (Vickrey-Harsanyi) or a maximin strategy (Rawls,
1971) to evaluate welfare under alternative policies. This form of ignorance is sometimes justified
as capturing how an "objectively detached" observer should evaluate alternative policies even
if actual participants in the political process use other criteria. (Roemer. 1996). An approach
based on the veil of ignorance is widely used in practical work in evaluating different income
distributions (see Sen, 1973). It is an empirically tractable approach because it only requires
10information about the marginal distributions of outcomes produced under differentpolicies. The
empirical literature on evaluating income inequality uses this criterion tocompare the consequences
of growing wage inequality in the past two decades (See,e.g. Karoly, 1992). Individual outcomes
under alternative policies are either assumed to be independent or elseany dependence is assumed
to be irrelevant for assessing alternative policies. This analysis isintrinsically static, whereas
actual policy comparisons are made in real time: a current base state iscompared to a future
potential state.
An empirically more accurate description of social decision making ina democratic welfare
state recognizes that persons act in their own self-interest, or in the interest of certain other
groups (e.g. the poor, the less able) and have at least partial knowledge about how they (or the
groups they are interested in) will fare under different policies, and act on those perceptions, but
only imperfectly anticipate their outcomes under different policy regimes. Even if outcomes in
alternative policy regimes are completely unknown (and hence represent a random draw from the
outcome distribution), the outcomes under the current policy are known. The outcomes in different
regimes may be dependent so that persons who benefit under one policy may also benefit under
another. For a variety of actual social choice mechanisms, both the initial and final positions of
each agent are relevant for evaluation of social policy.3 Politicians, policy makers and participants
in the welfare state are more likely to be interested in how specific policies affect the fortunes
This theme is developed in Heckman, Smith and Clements (1997), Heckman and Smith (1998). Coate (1998)
and Besley and Coate (1998).
11of specific groups measured from a benchmark state than in some abstract measure of "social
justice" .
However,agents may not possess perfect foresight so that the simple voting criterion may not
accurately predict choices and requires modification. Let I denote the information set available
to agent i, he (she) evaluates policy j against k using that information. Let F(y3, YkIL) bethe
distribution of outcomes (Y3,Yk)as perceivedby agent i. Under an expected utility criterion,
person i prefers policy j over k if
E(U() I')>E(U1(Yk) I).
Letting 9 parameterize heterogeneity in preferences, so U(Y) =U(Y3;0), and using integrals to
simplify the expressions, the proportion of people who prefer j is
(1-7) PB (jjj, k) =f1(E (U (; 0)1) > E (U (Yk; 0) II))dF (9,I),
where F(9, I) is the joint distribution of 9 and I in the population whose preferences over outcomes
are being studied.5 The voting criterion previously discussed is the special case where I, =
(Y,,Yk2),sothere is no uncertainty about Y and Yk, and
(1-8) PB(j!j,k)=fl(U(y2;9) >U(yk;O))dF(O,y3,yk).
4jabstractfrom the problem that politicians are more likely to be interested in voter perceptions of benefits in
different policy states than in actual (post_electoral) realizations.
Sjdonot claim that persons would necessarily vote "honestly", although in a binary choice setting they do
and there is no scope for strategic manipulation of votes. See Moulin (1983). PB is simply a measure of relative
satisfaction and need not describe a voting outcome where other factors come into play.
12Expression (1-8) is an integral version of (1-4) when outcomes are perfectly predictable and when
preference heterogeneity can be indexed by vector 0.
Adding uncertainty to the analysis makes it fruitful to distinguish between ex ante and ex
post evaluations. Ex post, part of the uncertainty about policy outcomes is resolved although
individuals do not, in general, have full information about what their potential outcomes would
have been in policy regimes they have not experienced and may have only incomplete information
about the policy they have experienced (e.g. the policy may have long runconsequences extending
after the point of evaluation). It is useful to index the information set I by t, (Ia), to recognize
that information about the outcomes of policies may accrue over time. Ex ante and ex post
assessments of a voluntary program need not agree. Ex post assessments of a program through
surveys administered to persons who have completed it (see Katz, Gutek, Kahn and Barton, 1975)
may disagree with ex ante assessments of the program. Both may reflect honest valuations of the
program but they are reported when agents have different information about it or have their
preferences altered by participating in the program. Before participating in a program. persons
may be uncertain of the consequences of participation in it. A person who has completed program
jmayknow Y, but can only guess at the alternative outcome Yk which they have not experienced.
In this case, ex post "satisfaction" for agent i is synonymous with the following inequality:
(1—9) U(Y) >E(U(Yk)'it),
wheretisthe post-program period in which the evaluation is made. In addition, survey ques-
13tionnaries about clienf' satisfaction with a program may capture subjective elements of program
experience not captured by "objective" measures of outcomes that usually exclude psychic costs
and benefits.
II. The Data Needed to Evaluate the Welfare State
To implement criteria (I-i) and (1-2), it is necessary to know the distribution of outcomes across
the entire population within each policy state and to know the utility functions of individuals.
In the case where Y refers to scalar income, criterion (1-3) only requires GNP (the sum of the
program jnetoutput). If interest centers solely on the distributions of outcomes of direct program
participants, the measures can be defined solely for populations with D3 =1.Criteria (1-4), (1-5),
(1-6) and (1-8) require knowledge of outcomes and preferences across policy states. Criterion (1-7)
requires knowledge of the joint distribution of information and preferences across persons. Tables
1A and lB summarize the criteria and the data needed to implement them. The cost-benefit
criterion is the least demanding; the voting criterion is the most demanding in that it requires
information about the joint distributions of outcomes across alternative policy states.
Three distinct types of information are required to implement these criteria: (a) private pref-
erences, including preferences toward the consumption and well being of others; (b) social prefer-
ences, as exemplified by social welfare function (I-i) and (c) distributions of outcomes in alternative
states, and for some criteria, such as the voting criterion, joint distributions of outcomes across
policy states. The reasons for the popularity of cost-benefit analysis are evident from these tables.
14An important practical problem rarely raised in the literature on "social justice" is thatmany
proposed criteria are not operational with current levels of knowledge.
There is a vast literature on the estimation of individual preferences defined over goods and
leisure although the literature on the determination of altruistic preferences is much smaller.
Within the framework of the microeconomic treatment effect literature, the decisions of the agents
to self select into a program reveal their preferences for it. Much of the standard literature
on estimating consumer preferences abstracts from heterogeneity. However, a growing body of
evidence summarized in Browning, Hansen and Beckman (1999) demonstrates that heterogeneity
in marginal rates of substitution across goods at a point in time, and for the same good over time,
is substantial. This heterogeneity is large across demographic and income groups and is large even
within narrowly defined demographic categories.6 There are surprisingly few estimates of social
welfare function (I-i) (Maital, 1973; Saez, 1998; and Gabaix, 1998 are exceptions), despite the
widespread use of the social welfare function in public economics. The paucity of estimates of it
suggests that the social welfare function is an empirically empty concept. It is a misleading, but
traditional, intellectual crutch without operational content.7
Responses to income shocks, wages and the like vary widely across consumers. The evidence
GSee e.g., Heckman, 1974a.
7Saez and Gabaix assume that tax schedules are set optimally using a social welfare function and derive the
local curvature of the social welfare function that generates policy outcomes. They do not test that proposition.
Ahined and Stern (1984) test the proposition that taxes and subsidies in India are generated by optimizing a social
welfare function.
15speaks strongly against the representative agent model or the various simplificat ions used to justify
RBC models. The focus of the empirical analysis of this paper is on estimating the distributions
of outcomes across policy states as a first step 'toward empirically implementing the full criteria.
This more modest objective can fit into the framework of Section I by assuming that utilities are
linear in their arguments and identical across persons. Even this more modest goal is a major
challenge, as we shall see.
The policy evaluation problem in its most general form can be written as estimating a vector of
outcomes, for each person in each policy state. Consider policies j and k. The potential outcomes
are
(IT-i) (yr,Y) 1I.
Macroeconomic approaches focus exclusively on mean outcomes or some other low dimensional
representation of the aggregate (e.g. geometric means). There are two important cases of this
macro problem: (a) the case where jandk have been experienced in the past and (b) where one
of jork, or possibly both, have never been observed. The first case requires that we "adjust"
the data on j and k to account for changes in the conditioning variables between the observation
period and the period for which the policy is proposed to be implemented. Such adjustments are
sometimes controversial. If the environment is stationary, no adjustment is required. With panel
data on persons, one could build up the joint distribution of policy outcomes by observing the
same people under different regimes.
16The classical macroeconomic general-equilibrium policy-evaluation problem considered byKnight
(1921), Tinbergen (1956), Marschak (1953), Theil (1961), Lucas and Sargent (1981) and Lucas
(1987) forecasts and evaluates the impacts of policies that have never been implemented. To do
this requires knowledge of policy-invariant structural parameters and a basis formaking proposed
new policies comparable to old ones.8
An entire literature on structural estimation in econometrics has emerged in anattempt to
solve this problem. By focusing on the "representative consumer", this literature simplifies a hard
problem by ignoring the issue of individual heterogeneity in outcomes within each regime.9 If
outcomes were indeed identical across persons, or if the representative consumer were a "reason-
ably good" representation, from knowledge of aggregate means, one could answer all of the policy
evaluation questions in Tables 1A and lB provided that preferences were known. This is a conse-
quence of the implicit assumption of the representative consumer model that the joint distribution
of (11-1) is degenerate.
The common form of the microeconomic evaluation problem is apparently more tractable. It
considers evaluation of a program in which participation is voluntary although it may not have
been intended to be so. Accordingly, it is not well suited to evaluating programs with universal
A quotation from Knight is apt "The existence of a problem in knowledge depends on the future being different
from the past, while the possibility of a solution of the problem depends on the future being like the past". (Knight.
1921, p. 313.)
9As summarized in Browning, Hansen and Heckman (1999), there is an emerging literature in macroeco-
nomics that recognizes the evidence of microheterogeneity and its consequences for model construction and policy
evaluation.
17coverage such as a social security program.
Persons are offered a service through a program and may select into the program to receive it.
A distinction is made between direct participation in the program and indirect participation. The
latter occurs when people pay taxes or suffer the market consequences of changed supplies as a
consequence of the program. Eligibility for the program may be restricted to subsets of persons in
the larger society. Many "mandatory" programs allow that persons may attrite from them or fail
to comply with program requirements. Participation in the program is thus equated with direct
receipt of the service, and payments of taxes and general-equilibrium effects of the program are
typically ignored.1°
In this formulation of the evaluation problem, the no-treatment outcome distribution for a
given program is used to approximate the distribution of outcomes in the no-program state. That
is, the outcomes of the "untreated" within the framework of an existing program are used to
approximate outcome distributions when there is no program. This approximation rests on two
distinct arguments: (a) that general-equilibrium effects inclusive of taxes and spillover effects
on factor and output markets can be ignored; and (b) that the problem of selection bias that
arises from using self-selected samples of participants and nonparticipants to estimate population
"The contrast between micro and macro analysis is overdrawn. Baumol and Quandt (1966), Lancaster (1971)
and Domencich and McFadden (1975) are micro examples of attempts to solve what we have called a macro
problem. Those authors consider the problem of forecasting the demand for a new good which has never previously
been purchased.
18distributions can be ignored or surmounted.1' The treatment effect approach also converts the
evaluation problem into a comparison between an existing program janda benchmark no-program
st.ate rather than into a comparison between any two hypothetical states jandk.'2
More precisely, let j be the policy regime to be evaluated. Eligible person i in regime jhas
two potential outcomes: (Y, Y), where the superscripts denote non-direct participation ("0")
and direct participation ("1"). Ineligible persons have only one option: Theseoutcomes
are defined at the equilibrium level of participation under program j.Allfeedback effects are
incorporated in the definitions of the potential outcomes.
Let subscript "0" denote a policy regime without the program. Let D3 =1if person i
participates in program j.Acrucial identifying assumption that is implicitly invoked in the
microeconomic evaluation literature is
(A-i)
i.e. that the no program outcome for i is the same as the no treatment outcome.
Letting F(a Ib)denote the conditional distribution of a given b, the assumption implies that
F(y3° D =0,X) =F(yoID= 0,X) for y2° =Yogiven conditioning variables X. The outcome
of nonparticipants in policy regime jisthe same in the no policy state "0" or in the state where
As we note below, evidence from self-selection decisions can be used to evaluate private preferences for the
program so that in principle we can use the "problem" of self selection as a source of information about private
valuations. See, e.g.Heckman,(1974a,b), and Heckman and Honoré (1990) where this is done.
121n the case of multiple observed treatments, comparisons can be made among observed outcomes as well as
against a benchmark no program state.
19policy jisoperative. This assumption is consistent with a program that has "negligible" general
equilibrium effects and where the same structure of tax revenue collection is used in regimes jand
From data on individual program participation decisions, it is possible to infer the implicit
valuations of the program made by persons eligible for it. These evaluations constitute all of the
data needed for a libertarian program evaluation, but more than these are required to evaluate
programs in the interventionist welfare state. For certain decision rules, it is possible to use the
data from self-selected samples to bound or estimate the joint distributions required to implement
criteria (1-4) or (1-7), as I demonstrate below. I now consider how access to microdata and social
experiments enables one to answer the evaluation questions posed in Section I.
III. What Can Be Learned From Micro Data and Social Experiments?
This section considers the information produced from social experiments and from ordinary
observational data. Even abstracting from the problem that the analysis of these data typically
ignores general-equilibrium effects, the information produced by them is surprisingly limited unless
a strong form of homogeneity is invoked. This homogeneity assumption is implicitly invoked in
most micro studies so there is a closer kinship between micro and representative agent approaches
than might be first thought. The micro studies condition more finely. Both macro and micro
studies ignore well-documented sources of heterogeneity among agents in responses to programs.
20Consider the analysis of program jandassume that assumption (A-i) is invoked. Within the
framework of the treatment effect" literature, we observe one of the following pair
(}O, }')
for person i. To simplify the notation, I drop the jsubscriptin this section. At a point in time.
we caimot observe a person simultaneously in the treated and untreated state. In general. we
cannot form the gain of moving from "0" to 1" and L —for anyone. The evaluation
problem is reformulated to the population level. The goal becomes to estimate some features of
the distribution of L. To clarify this approach let D =1if person i is a direct participant, and
D, =0if person i is not a direct participant. We observe Y,
=D1Y' +(1— DZ)Y
for each person.
The potential outcomes for person i can be written as
(111-i)
(111-2) =u+ 1i
where E(Eo) =E(1)=0.The means can be written in terms of observed characteristics X
(1i0(X); 1i1(X)) but for simplicity of notation we suppress this dependence. Thus we can may
write
(111-3) =/.L0 +(/
—+ E, —o)D,+ Oj
21Most of the evaluation literature formulates the parameters of interest as means. Two means
receive the most attention. The first is
E(Y1 -Y°)
the average treatment effect ("ATE") that records the average gain of moving a randomly selected
person from "0" to "1". A second mean is
E(Y1-Y°ID=1)
the effect of treatment on the treated (TT). The two means are the same under one of the following
conditions:
(C-i): E11= so=
(Noresponse heterogeneity given X)
or
(C-2): E(E1, —E0 I D=1)=0
(Agents do not enter the program based on gains from it).
Under (C-i), outcome responses are identical among persons with given observed characteristics
X. Under (C-2), outcomes may differ among persons with identical X characteristics but ex
ante there is no perceived heterogeneity. (Persons place themselves at the mean of the response
distribution for "0" and "1" in making their participation decisions.)
22To understand these distinctions, it is useful to consider three regression models. Write the
traditional textbook model as:
(A)Y, = ++ ,E(U)=0.
In this framework ci is a common coefficient for each i.It embodies assumption (C-i) where
=02 anda == — i-•There is no idiosyncratic response to treatment among persons
with the same observed characteristics X. This is the textbook model of econometric policy
evaluation and the textbook model of econometrics. Selection or simultaneity bias is said to arise
if E(U, ID,=1)0.
In contrast, consider a second model:
(B) Y =ao+a1D+U,E(U) =0where E(a,1) =jt1i.'o but V =c—E(ai) =E11
satisfies E(V ID,=1)=0or equivalently E(E11 —I D1=1)=0.
In this framework, responses are different across persons (c has an i subscript) but conditional
on X, persons do not participate in the program based on these differential responses.'3 Again
selection bias is said to arise if E(U, D =1)0.
If persons participate in the program based on these differential responses, we obtain
(C) 'c=+ o1D1 + U,E(U) =0
1Another way to say this is that
Pr(D1 =1Z,V) = Pr(D1=1Zr).Thisis a "noncausality" condition.
23E(U, D =1)OE(E1 60i D, =1).
Again, selection bias for E(Y1, —I D=1)is said to arise if E(U D =1)0.
Under models A and B, the parameters E(Y1 —Y0)and E(Y1 —YoD =1),are the same.
Under Model C, they are not. These distinctions, first introduced in Heckman and Robb (1985,
1986) and Heckman (1992), have important consequences for what can be learned from micro
evaluations.
Model (A) is the dominant paradigm in the applied literature. If it is true, and if assumption
(A-i) is also true, we can go from a regression estimate of equation (A) to answer all of the policy
questions posed in Section I comparing the policy being evaluated with a benchmark no policy
state. The distribution of gains, ,acrossand within policy regimes is degenerate. Everyone either
benefits or loses from the policy. In this case the inferences obtained from the representative agent
paradigm, the inferences obtained from cost-benefit analysis, and the inferences obtained from the
treatment effect literature are the same.
Model (B) captures heterogeneity but assumes that persons do not act on it. Now the repre-
sentative agent paradigm should be adjusted to account for variation in individual responses to
the program; the cost-benefit approach is robust to this form of heterogeneity because it consid-
ers only mean outcomes. The treatment effect approach requires estimation of the variances of
outcomes,'4 If outcomes are heterogeneous in the sense of model (B), conventional instrumental
'4See e.g.Heckman,Smith and Clements, 1997.
24variable and matching methods can be used to secure estimates of mean parameters. As long as
means are the focus of attention, estimation of model (B) raises only well-known and easily solved
heteroscedasticity problems. However, apart from the study by Heckman, Clements and Smith
(1997). there are few studies that estimate the distributions of program impacts.
Model (C) captures a fundamental form of heterogeneity. Agents know more than the observing
economist and they act on this information in deciding whether or not to participate in a program.
E(Y1 —Y0)E(Y1 —Y0D =1).Estimating the full parameters of the outcome distributions
and their correlations over states is a frontier topic in econometrics with recent developments
surveyed in Heckman (1999). In this case standard instrumental variable methods break down
(see Heckman, 1997 or Heckman and Vytlacil, 1998). Heckman, Smith and Clements (1997)
and Heckman and Smith (1998) present estimates of outcome distributions under Model (C).
Heckinan, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998) present evidence that Model (C) describes the data
for the prototypical training program discussed in Section V below. While most of the thinking
about program evaluation is in terms of Model (A) or more recently, in terms of Model (B),
considerable evidence supports Model (C) for many programs.
As noted by Heckman (1992), the enthusiasm for social experiments in the policy evaluation
community is premised on the implicit acceptance of Model (A). Knowing the mean impact c is
enough to answer all of the policy evaluation questions posed in Section I. The joint distribution
of (IT-i) is degenerate when k is the benchmark n&-program state. Even if randomization alters
25the composition of program participants (i. e. there is "randomization bias"), for any observed X
in the experiment we can obtain c1.
If Model (C) characterizes the data, all we can recover from social experiments administered to
people who apply and are accepted into the program (the common point in the enrollment process
where randomization is administered) are
F(y'ID=1) and F(y°D=1).
We cannot recover the joint distribution F(y',
ID=1)either for persons who seek to participate
in the program or for the general population. Below, we discuss what can be learned in this case.
First, however, we consider what can be learned from participation decisions under Model (C).
Information From Revealed Preference
If agents act on the idiosyncratic gain from the program, so model (C) is the appropriate one,
it is possible to use this information to infer the implicit valuations they place on the gains from
the program being evaluated. If they do not participate on the basis of the gain, then clearly there
is no information on the gain from participation decisions. Participation includes voluntary entry
into a program or attrition from it.'5
'Heckman (1974a,b) demonstrates how access to censored samples on hours of work, wages for workers, and
employment choices identifies the joint distribution of the value of nonmarket time and potential market wages
under a normality assumption. Heckman and Honoré (1990) consider nonparametric versions of this model without
labor supply.
26The prototypical framework is the Roy (1951) model. In that setup,
(111-4) D =1(Y'￿ Y°),
so participation depends only on the net gain from the program:=Y'—Y°.Using equa-




—i0(X))).Under conditions specified in Heckman and Honoré (1990), the joint distri-
bution F(y°, y', D) can be identified nonparametrically.'6 Thus we can form all of the evaluation
parameters presented in Tables 1A and lB if the Roy model describes the data.
The crucial feature of the Roy model is that the decision to participate in the program is made
solely in terms of potential outcomes. No new unobservable variables enter the model that do not
appear in the outcome equations.'7 In this case, information about who participates also informs
us about the distribution of the value of the program to participants F(y1 —y°IY' > Y°, X).
Thus, we acquire the distribution of implicit values of the program for participants, which is all
that is required in a libertarian evaluation of the program. However, in the general case evaluation
of the welfare state requires information about "objective" outcomes and their distributions that
t6Heckman and Honore (1990) demonstrate that if X is independent of(Ei,Eo), Var(Ei) < :-andVar(Eo) < c'c.
and (Ei.EU) arenormal, the full model F(y°, y', D IX) is identified even if we only observe Y° or Y1 for any person
and there are no regressors and no exclusion restrictions. If instead of assuming normality, it is assumed that the
supports of(X)and 1i0(X) overlap or contain the supports of ElandEU,thefull model (i(X), (X))and the
joint distribution of El. EU are nonparametrically identified up to location normalizations. Precise conditions are
given in Theorem A-i in Appendix A of Heckman and Smith. 1998.
'7V,Tcouldaugment decision rule (111-4) to be D =1(Y1
— — k(Z)￿ 0). Provided that we measure Z
and condition on it, and provided that (U1 —(Jo)J.L(X.Z),the model remains nonparametrically identified. The
crucial property of the identification result is that no new unobservable enters the model through the participation
equation. However, if we add Z, subjective valuations of gain (Y1 —Y°—k(Z))no longer equal 'objective" measures
(yl —Y°).
27are needed to make the interpersonal comparisons that are an essential feature of the welfare state.
Only in the Roy model do the "objective" and "subjective" evaluations coincide.18
Heckman and Smith (1998) extend the Roy model to allow for uncertainty in the outcomes
as perceived by agents. They show that even when Y° and Y1 are independent or even nega-
tively correlated iii the population, purposive decision making produces positive dependence in
the population.
Observe that under the assumptions that make it valid, estimation of a Roy model on ordinary
nonexperimental data produced by the self-selection decisions of participants is more informative
than analysis of experimental data on persons who attempt to enter the program. As noted
by Heckman (1992) and Moffitt (1992), social experiments as typically conducted on persons who
apply and are initially accepted into a program do not provide information about the determinants
of program participation. Nonexperimental data can be used to infer the preferences of agents
who select into the program.
Appendix A presents a discussion of the relationship between the parameters of cost-benefit
analysis and the Roy model. Many of the parameters estimated in the micro evaluation literature
are not the ones needed to conduct a rigorous cost-benefit analysis. For this reason, this literature
'If the Roy model is extended to allow for variables other than Y°, Y1 (and the observed conditioning variables)
to determine participation, then the decision rule is changed to D 1(IN >0) where IN =ij(Y1,Y°,V.X), and
it is not possible to identify the joint distribution F(uo. u1) even if the unobservables V, U0 and U1 are independent
of X. Heckman (1990a) demonstrates that in this more general case, provided that some structure is placed on i
wecan nonparametrically identify F(y°. D X) and F(y'. D X) but not the full joint distribution F(y°. y D X).
A generalization of his proof is given in Theorem A-2 of Appendix A of Heckman and Smith, 1998.
28is not as informative about the economic aspects of program evaluation as one might hope.
The Problem of Recovering Joint Distributions
In the general case where textbook model (A) does not apply, and responses to programs are
heterogeneous, we encounter a difficult evaluation problem. Unless the Roy model is invoked, we
cannot identify the joint distribution of (Y°, Y'). At best we can extract the marginal distributions
of Y° and Y', even from ideal social experiments. This leaves considerable uncertainty about our
ability to implement the voting criterion and many other position-dependent majority voting
criteria discussed in Section I.
To see this problem, suppose that we have data from an ideal social experiment so that standard
self-selection problems can be ignored. Suppose that there are N treated and N untreated persons
and that the outcomes are continuously distributed. Rank the individuals in each treatment
category in the order of their outcome values from the highest to the lowest. Defineas the 1th
highest-ranked person in the jdistribution.Ignoring ties, we obtain two data distributions the
gain:
Treatment Outcome:F(y'D =1)Non-Treatment Outcome:F(y°ID1)
Y() Y)
N) N)
29We know the marginal data distributions F(y'ID =1)and F(y°D =1),but we do not know
where person i in the treatment distribution would appear in the non-treatment distribution.'9
Corresponding to the ranking of the treatment outcome distribution, there are N! possible
patterns of outcomes in the associated non-treatment outcome distribution. By considering all
possible permutations, one can form a collection of possible impact distributions, i.e., alternative
distributions of the gain:
/=:"—He
where fl is a particuJar N x N permutation matrix of Y° in the set of all N! permutations asso-
ciating the ranks in the Y' distribution with the ranks in the Y° distribution; and ,Y1and Y°
are N x 1 vectors of impacts, treated and untreated outcomes. By considering all possible permu-
tations, one can obtain all possible sortings of treatment, andnon-treatment, Y°, outcomes
using realized values from one distribution as counterfactuals for the other.
Model (A) assumes a constant treatment effect for all persons conditional on characteristics.
This model admits only one permutation: H =Ifor each X. The best in one distribution is the
best in the other distribution. In the common effect case, Y' and Y° differ by a constant for each
person. A generalization of that model preserves perfect dependence in the ranks between the
'These distributions can also be defined conditional on X.
30two distributions but does not require the impact to be the same at all quantiles of the base state
distribution.
In place of ranks, it is easier to work with the percentiles of the Y1 and Y° distributions.
which have much better statistical properties.2° Equating percentiles across the two distributions,
one can form the pairs across the distributions and obtain a deterministic gain function (yi, yo).
This presents the gain in going from benchmark state "0" to outcome state "1". For the case of
absolutely continuous distributions with positive density at y°, the gain function can be written as
(y°) =F(F0 (y° ID= 1))—y°.One can test non-parametrically for the classical common effect
model by determining if percentiles are uniformly shifted at all points of the distribution. One
can form other pairings across percentiles by mapping percentiles from the Y' distribution into
percentiles from the Y° distribution using the map T : q1 —q0.The data are consistent with all
admissible transformations including q0 =100—q1,where the best in one distribution is mapped
into the worst in the other. They cannot reject any of these models or more general models where
H is a Markov transition matrix and we consider all possible Markov matrices.
I now consider empirical evidence on the question of the constancy of the gross gainacross
base state quantiles using earnings data from an experimental evaluation of a major U.S. job
training program described in Appendix B. Figure 1 displays the estimate of earnings gains z(yo)
for adult women assuming that the best persons in the "1" distribution are the best in the .rj"
2SeeHeckman and Smith, 1993, Heckman, Smith and Clements, 1997.
31distribution. More formally, Figure 1 assumes that the permutation matrix H =I.No conditioning
is made, so the full sample is utilized. Between the 25th and 85th percentiles the assumption of
a constant impact is roughly correct. This evidence supports Model (A). However, the data
are grossly at odds with this model at the highest and lowest percentiles.21 Heckman, Smith and
Clements (1997) and Heckman and Smith (1993, 1998) present a more extensive empirical analysis
of data using different conditioning sets and reach essentially the same conclusion. Observe t.hat
even though the ranks are assumed to be perfectly dependent across the two distributions, there
is substantial heterogeneity in the gains at different points of the base state distribution.
IV. Evidence on Impact Heterogeneity and the Value of Self-Assessments and
Revealed Preference Information
This section of the paper address three questions. Question (1) is: "What is the empirical evi-
dence on heterogeneity in program impacts among persons?" The conventional approach implicitly
assumes impact homogeneity conditional on observables. This assumption greatly simplifies the
task of evaluating the welfare state. Using data on earnings from an experimental evaluation of
a prototypical job training program described in detail in Appendix B, I implement the crite-
ria discussed in Section I to bound or identify the joint distribution of outcomes conditional on
D =1.There is considerable evidence of heterogeneity of program impacts, so that conventional
econometric methods do not take one very far in constructing the evaluation criteria discussed
21Staridard errors for the quantiles are obtained using methods described in Csorgo (1993).
32in Section I. Use of experimental data enables us to avoid the self-selection problems that plague
ordinary observational data, and simplifies our analysis.
Given the evidence on impact heterogeneity, I ask question (2): "How sensitive are the estimates
of the proportion of people who gain from the program -whatI have called the voting criterion'
-toalternative assumptions about the dependence between Y° and Y1?" The estimates are very
sensitive to alternative assumptions. At the same time, for adult women, the estimated percentage
that benefit from the program exceeds 50 percent in every case I consider but one, and is close to
100 percent in some cases.
Some of the estimates used to answer question (2) assume that Y° and Y' are positively
dependent given D =1.Under purposive selection based on outcomes in the treated and untreated
states, such dependence among participants arises even if Y' and Y° are independent or negatively
correlated in the population as a whole. (Heckman and Smith, 1998). An alternative to imposing
a particular decision rule is to infer it from self-assessments of the program. These assessments are
all that are required for a libertarian evaluation of the welfare state. I examine the implicit value
placed on the program by addressing the following questions: (3a) "Are persons who applied
to the program and were accepted into it but then randomized out of it placed in an inferior
position relative to those accepted applicants who were not randomized out?" I measure ex ante
rational regret using second-order stochastic dominance, which is an appropriate measure under
the assumption that individuals are completely uncertain of both Y' and Y° before going into
33the program. I also consider ex post evaluations of participants by asking: (3b) How satisfied'
are participants with their experience in the program?" Self-assessments of programs are widely
used in evaluation research (see e.g., Katz, et al., 1975), but the meaning to be placed on them
is not clear. Do they reflect an evaluation of the experience of the program (its process) or an
evaluation of the benefits of the program? The evidence presented here suggests that respondents
report a net benefit inclusive of their costs of participating in the program. Groups for whom the
program has a negative average impact as estimated by the "objective" experimental data express
as much (or more) enthusiasm for the program as groups with positive average impacts. A third
source of revealed preference evaluations uses the revealed choices of attriters from the program.
Econometric models of self-selection since Heckman (1974a,b) have used revealed choice behavior
to infer the evaluations people place on programs either by selecting into them or dropping out of
them. The third part of the third question is thus (3c): "What implicit valuation of the program
do attriters place on it?" I do not examine this question in this paper. Heckman and Smith (1998)
present evidence on it.
Evidence on Heterogeneity
Heckman and Smith (1993, 1998) apply the rionparametric Frechet Bounds of classical proba-
bility theory to the JTPA data to establish that the variance of the gain z is positive for a variety
of conditioning sets. Their estimate for the JTPA data is reported in the first row of Table 6. The
$675 lower bound on the standard deviation is to be compared with a $400 gain and mean $7200
34base income for women. Heckman and Smith report a variety of other estimates thatsupport
the conclusion that even within narrowly defined conditioning sets, the variance in outcomes is
substantial for women and for other demographic groups.22
Using the sample data from the JTPA experiment (see Orr, et a!., 1995) and discussed in
Appendix A, and in Heckman and Smith (1998), we may pair percentiles of the Y1 and Y°
distributions for any choice of rank correlation r between -1.0 and 1.0. The case of r= 1.0
corresponds to the case of perfect positive dependence, where iTT =Iand qi =qo.The case where
r =-1.0corresponds to the case of perfect negative dependence, where q1 =100—q. The first and
last rows of Table 2 display estimates of quantiles of the impact distribution and other features of
the impact distribution for these two cases.
Heckman, Smith and Clements (1997) show how to obtain random samples of permutations
conditional on values of rbetween1.0 and -1.0. Table 2 displays two sets of estimates from their
work. The first set assumes positive but not perfect dependence between the percentiles of Y'
and Y°. with i-= 0.95.Estimates based on a random sample of 50 percentile permutations with
this value of rappearin the second column of Table 2. These results show that even a modest
departure from perfect positive dependence substantially widens the distribution of impacts. More
22The classical solution to bounding a joint distribution from its marginals uses the Frechet-Hoeffding bounds:
Max[F(y1(D 1)±F(y° D =1).—1,O]<F(i',y° D =1)<Min(F(y1 D =1),F(y°D =1)).
These do not directly apply to the distribution of the gain= — Y°but can be used to bound the variance of
the gain. See Heckman and Smith (1993; 1998) for details.
35striking still are the results in the third column of Table 2. which correspond to the case where
r =0.0.This value of r is implied by independence between the percentiles of Y' and Y°. Here
(as in the case with r =-1.0)the distribution of estimated impacts is implausibly wide with large
positive values in each distribution often matched with zero or small positive values in the other.
However, the conclusion that a majority of adult female participants benefit from the program is
robust to the choice of r.23
Even though many joint distributions of outcomes are consistent with the marginals produced
from a social experiment, one model is not: common effect model (A). Heckman, Smith and
Clements test and reject the assumption that L(= ai)isa common coefficient, using a variety
of conditioning sets. Heterogeneity is a central feature of the data, even within narrowly defined
demographic categories.
Assuming the Gain Is Independent of the Base
Suppose that random coefficient model (B) of Section III is true. In that framework, suppose
that z is not known at the time decisions to go into the program are made. Then if Y° is known,
Y° is independent of z.Otherwisethe coefficient cx1, is correlated with D1. In applying this to
experimental data, let R =1if a person who applies and is provisionally accepted into the program
2Heckman, Smith and Clements (1997) present methods for allowing for mass points of zero earnings in the
population, and some evidence derived from such methods. Their qualitative conclusions on variability are similar
to ours.
36is randomized into the program, and R =0if a provisionally accepted applicant is randomized
out. Y =Y°+ R, and R is statistically independent of Y°.
In the notation of Section III, we obtain a conventional random coefficient model for a regres-
sion: Y =RY'+ (1 —R)Y°=ao+ ci1R +£0. Usinga components of variance model, one may




Using a standard random coefficient model, we can estimate the variance of V. The first row
of Table 3 presents estimates of the random coefficient using these assumptions. The evidence
supports the hypothesis that VAR(L) >0,suggesting that a more elaborate approach to estimat-
ing the distribution ofbased on deconvolution is likely to be fruitful. If we maintain normality
of Y1 and Y° (given D =1and X), the distribution ofis normal with meanand variance
VAR(L) and deconvolution is easy to perform. Under this assumption, we can estimate the voting
criterion and determine the estimated proportion of people who benefit from the program.
More generally, it is not necessary to assume that the distribution ofis normal. I use
the deconvolution procedure presented in Beckman, Smith and Clements (1997), t.o estimate
the distribution of impacts nonparametrically. Table 3 presents parameters calculated from this
37distribution. The evidence suggests that under this assumption, about 43% of adultwomen were
harmed by participating in the program. The estimated density is presented in Figure 2 and is
clearly non-normal. Nonetheless, the estimated variance of the nonparametric gain distribution
matches the variance for the gain distribution obtained from the random coefficient model within
the range of the sampling error of the two estimates. The estimates of the proportion who benefit
are in close agreement across the two models when normality is imposed on the random coefficient
model. The fact that a positive density is estimated indicates that the assumption underlying
model (B) of Section III is consistent with the data for women and provides some support for the
hypothesis that agents do not select into the program based on •24
However,the evidence against matching as a method of evaluating social programs that is
presented in Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998) and in Heckman, Ichimura and Todd
(1997), suggests that in most demographic groups, persons act on unobservable gains in making
program enrollment decisions. Matching assumes a (nonparametric) version of model B. Since
the cited papers test, and reject, the matching assumption using the same JTPA data as used in
this paper. a model of purposive selection on unobserved gains (Model C) is a more appropriate
description of the JTPA data.
Testing For Kr Ante Stochastic Rationality of Participants
If individuals choose whether or not to participate in the program based on the gross gains
24These calculations were first presented in Heckman and Smith (1993).
38from it, if they possess concave utility functions (not necessarily the same across persons), and
if they know the marginal distribution of outcomes in the participation and non-participation
states, then second-order stochastic dominanceshuld imply that they order the distributions of
outcomes for persons who sought to go into the program. For non-negativey°this form of
rationality implies that
(IV-i) f F1(y ID =1)dy'<f Fo(y°ID =1)dy°for all ER.
Draws from the Y' distribution produce higher expected utility than draws from the Y° distrib-
ution among participants. The difference between the two integrals is a measure of regret among
persons randomized out from the program and forced into the no-treatment state. This condition
may fail for many reasons: persons may possess more information about their potential outcomes
than just the marginal distributions; or persons may participate in the program on a principle
other than expected utility formulated in terms of gross outcomes. Condition (TV-i) is a sufficient
condition. Agents might still prefer distribution 1 even if it is not satisfied. Thus failure to reject
is informative; rejection is not.
I test condition (IV-1) by comparing the integrals of the empirical CDFs of the control
and treatment group earnings distributions for various values of o. Table 4 displays the re-
sults of tests of the null hypothesis of equality of the integrated distributions in (TV-i) for
adult males and females and male and female youth using self-reported earnings in the eighteen
months after random assignment. The table displays test results for c€{$2, 500, $5, 000, $10, 000,
39$15, 000, $20, 000, $25, 000}.Standarderrors are obtained by bootstrapping. For adult males, the
integrated CDF of earnings for the control group exceeds that for the treatment group at every
point, with a p-value below 0.05 for a <$16. 500. and below 0.10 for a <$22,500, which includes
most of the supports of the two earnings distributions. The data for adult females provide strong
evidence of rational behavior in the sense of (TV-i), passing the test at the five percent level or
better for every value of a. This evidence suggests that personal objectives and program objectives
are aligned for adult women. Results for youth are mixed. For male youth, for whom the mean
experimental impact is significantly negative, the difference in integrated CDF's is negative for
most values of a, though not statistically significant. For female youth, the difference switches
sign around a =$11,000,but is never close to statistical significance.25
Evidence from Self-Assessments of Program Participants
Self-assessments of program participants are an alternative to comparisons of observed out-
comes as a measure of program impact. Unlike the ex ante measures based on second-order
stochastic dominance, these measures are statements about ex post expectations. There is no
reason why the two measures should agree if people revise their assessments based on what they
learn about a program by participating in it. In this section. I consider the strengths and lim-
itations of self-reported assessments of satisfaction with the program as an evaluation criterion,
2These tests of second order stochastic dominance of treatment distributions were first presented in Heckman
and Smith (1993, 1998) and Heckman, Smith and Clements (1997).
40and report on self-evaluations by participants in the JTPA experimental treatment group. I also
consider what can be learned from self-assessment data regarding the heterogeneity of individual
treatment effects and the rationality of prograni participants.
Using participant assessments to evaluate a program has two main advantages relative to
the approaches already discussed. First, participants have information not available to external
program evaluators. They typically know more about certain components of the cost of program
participation than do evaluators. Most evaluations, including the National JTPA Study, do not
even attempt to value participant time, transportation. child care or other costs in evaluating
program effectiveness, unless they are paid by the program through subsidies. Participants are
likely to include such information in arriving at their self-assessments of the program. Second,
participant evaluations provide information about the values placed on outcomes by participants
relative to their perceived cost. They have the potential of providing a more inclusive measure
of the programs effects than would be obtained from looking only at gross outcomes—one that
includes "client satisfaction". To some parties in the welfare state, "customer satisfaction' is an
important aspect of a program. They make an input-based measure of program evaluation and
not an output-based measure.
However, participant self-assessments may not be informative on the outcomes of interest to
other parties in the welfare state. In evaluations of medical interventions, for example, treatment.
effects may not be observed by participants or may be difficult for them to assess compared to
41what observing scientists might report. Participant assessments of the counterfactual state may
be faulty because participants' judgements are based on inputs or on outcome levels rather than
gains over alternative levels. Persons who chose to go into the program may rationalize their
participation in it by responding to questions in a certain way. In addition, self-assessments, like
all utility-based measures, are difficult to compare across individuals.
The top panel of Table 5 reports JTPA participant responses to a question about whether or
not the program made them better off.26 Assuming people answer honestly, and are reporting a
gross impact, the self-assessment data clearly contradict the hypothesis of impact homogeneity.
For all four demographic groups, 65 to 70 percent of self-reported participants give a positive
self-assessment, not the 100% or 0% predicted if impacts were homogeneous. However, if respon-
dents are reporting a perceived net impact, the evidence reported in Table 5 does notnecessarily
contradict an assumption of gross impact homogeneity if there is heterogeneity in costs across
participants. The entries in the third row of Table 5 reveal that the fractions reporting a posi-
tive impact are far lower than those obtained from all of the analyses using outcome data. This
evidence is consistent with one of two hypotheses: (a) that respondents are reporting net out-
comes and that costs borne by participants are a substantial fraction of gross outcomes or (b) that
self-assessments are inaccurate.
26The exact wording of the survey question is 'Do you think that the training or other assistance you got from
the program helped you get a job or perform better on the job?" The question is asked only of treatment group
members who report receiving JTPA services.
42The evidence suggests that the self-assessments are at least partly based on inputs received
rather than on outputs produced by the program. The lower panel of Table 5 shows the fraction
of persons receiving each type of training whose self-assessment of the program was positive. The
fraction increases with the level of treatment intensity for all four demographic groups. Expensive
and more intensive services such as classroom training in occupational skills (CT-OS) and on-the-
job training at a private firm (OJT) elicit a higher proportion of positive self-assessments than
do less expensive services such as job search assistance (JSA) or basic education. However, the
experimental impact estimates presented in Bloom, et a!. (1993) reveal that treatment effectiveness
and treatment intensity are not positively related. For example, for female youth, classroom
training in occupational skills has a more negative mean impact than the less expensive services
in the "other" treatment stream. This evidence suggests that participants may have difficulty
correctly constructing what would have happened to them in the absence of treatment, and so
rely in part on treatment intensity or program inputs as a proxy for treatment impact.
Finally, for adult women we consider how well the self-assessment data match up with the
analyses considered in earlier sections. The self-assessment data are not consistent with the as-
sumption of perfect positive dependence in outcomes across the two states. As shown in Figure 1,
for adult women the JTPA data indicate that perfect positive dependence in outcomes between
the treated and untreated states implies a strictly positive impact of the program for about 85
percent of participants -allexcept those with zero earnings in both states. This value far ex-
43ceeds the overall self-reported effectiveness rate of 44 percent reported in row 3 of Table 5. The
44 percent rate lies below that found even for the case of perfect negative dependence. Overall,
the self-reported impact data appear to be too negative when compared to our analyses of the
experimental earnings data. This evidence is consistent with participants reporting a net measure
while the experimental "treatment effect" measures gross outcomes. The lower positive rating of
the program from self assessment data than from gross outcome data is all the more striking given
that the self-assessments are recorded only for people who report receiving training while the gross
outcome data for participants include those who leave the program, and the attriters have lower
earnings than the non-attriters.
Heckman and Smith (1998) present additional evidence on the JTPA program using the re-
vealed preferences of program dropouts. They document substantial heterogeneity in participant
evaluations of the program using this information.
Summary of the Evidence on Impact Heterogeneity and Its Consequences
Table 6 presents a summary of the main findings of this section. (1) Under a variety of different
assumptions, there is evidence of substantial heterogeneity in net impacts, .(2)The analysis
of self-assessments suggests that respondents are reporting different impacts from the "objective"
impacts determined from experimental data. This is a further source of heterogeneity and a source
of disparity across studies. (3) Departures from high levels of positive dependence between Y° and
Y' produce absurd ranges of impacts on gross outcomes. (The implicit correlations between Y°
44and Y' produced under different identifying assumptions are given in the last column of the table).
However, positive dependence is implied by economic models of self selection. These narrow the
range of dependence across outcome states. (4) The range of the estimated proportion of people
benefitting from the program in the sense of gross outcomes (the 'voting criterion") varies widely
under different assumptions about the dependence in outcomes. The data from the self-report
and attrition studies show a lower proportion benefitting -aphenomenon consistent with the
hypothesis that net returns and not gross returns are being reported by participants.
V. Accounting For General Equilibrium and Heterogeneity in Evaluating Human
Capital Policies
A major limitation of the microeconomic treatment effect literature is its failure to consider the
general equilibrium consequences of the programs being evaluated. Many human capital policies
are large scale in nature, and expansion of the stock of skill affects skill prices. Rational agents
will act on that information. This feedback substantially alters the inferences obtained from micro
economic evaluations.
In addition, many policies do not fall into the treatment effect" category at all. A tax on
labor earnings affects everyone, although not uniformly. There are no natural comparison groups
(or control groups) for policies with universal coverage.
Conventional general-equilibrium analysis ignores heterogeneity among agents and so is poorly
suited to analyze distributional issues. An important exception is the class of overlapping gener-
45ations models which explicitly consider inequality among generations. The goal of this section of
the paper is to extend the important empirical overlapping generations model of Auerbach and
Kotlikoff by (a) allowing for human capital and b) introducing heterogeneity in ability within
cohorts. Ability is a major determinant of human capital investment, and adding it to a model,
along with human capital, enables one to develop a model of human capital and wage formation
that can explain rising wage inequality and inequality within narrow schooling groups. This model
provides a framework which accounts for heterogeneity and diversity and which enables one to
answer the evaluation questions posed in Section I for a dynamic economy. It is a vehicle for
examining the performance of micro evaluation methods within a general equilibrium setting.
Heckman, Lochner and Taber (HLT, 1998a) formulate and estimate dynamic general equilib-
rium models with endogenous heterogeneous human capital accumulation. Their model explains
rising wage inequality in the U.S. economy. In this section of the paper, I use their model to study
the impacts on skill formation of proposals to switch from progressive taxes to flat income and
consumption taxes.
A Dynamic General Equilibrium Model of Human Capital Accumulation with Heterogeneous
Agents
HLT build on the model of Alan Auerbach and Laurence Kotlikoff (1987) in three ways:
(1) They introduce skill formation and consider both schooling choices and investment in on-
the-job training. (2) They allow for heterogeneity in ability, endowments and skills. Different
46schooling levels are associated with different skills and different post-school investment functions.
HLT discard the Auerbach-Kotlikoff efficiency units assumption for labor services. Models with
efficiency units for labor services do not explain rising wage inequality among skill groups. (3)
HLT use micro data joined with macro time series evidence to determine the parameters of the
model, rather than picking parameters in an unsystematic fashion from the micro literature or
'calibrating" the model to aggregates, as is commonly done in the empirical general equilibrium
literature.
The HLT model has three sources of heterogeneity among persons: (a) in age; (b) in ability to
learn and in initial endowments of ability and human capital (indexed by 9 below); and (c) in the
economic histories experienced by cohorts. In a transition period, different cohorts face different
skill prices, make different investment decisions and, hence, accumulate different amounts of human
capital and have different wage levels and trajectories. The HLT model extends the analysis of
James Davies and John Whalley (1991) who introduce human capital into the Auerbach-Kotlikoff
model but assume only one skill. HLT allow for multiple skills, incorporate both schooling and
on-the-job training, and allow for rational expectations in calculating transition paths.
In the HLT model, individuals live for ayearsand retire after aR ayears.In the first stage
of the lifecycle, a prospective student chooses the schooling option that gives him the highest level
of lifetime utility. Define Ka5asthe stock of physical capital held at time t by a person age a:
is the stock of human capital at time toftype S at age a with schooling S. The optimal lifecycle
47problem can be solved in two stages. First, condition on schooling S and solve for the optimal
path of consumption (C) and post-school investment time (Ia) for each schooling level. Second,
select among schooling levels to maximize lifetime welfare.




where5 is a time preference discount factor. HLT follow Laurence Kotlikoff, Kent Smetters, and
Jan Walliser (1997, henceforth KSW), by assuming that the tax schedule can be approximated by
a progressive tax on labor income and a flat tax on capital income. This gives a dynamic budget
constraint,
(V-2)K+1+1 K(i + (1 —Tk)Tt) +RH(1 —I)
—r(RH(i —i))
—
wherekisthe proportional tax rate on capital, r1 is the progressive tax schedule on labor earnings,
R is the price of human capital services of type S at time t, and Ttisthe net return on physical
capital at time t. Experiments with other progressive tax schedules produce results similar to
the ones reported here. HLT abstract from labor supply. Estimates of intertemporal substitution
in labor supply estimated on annual data are small, so ignoring labor supply does not affect our
analysis. (Browning, Hansen and Heckman. 1999). This simplification makes the HLT model
comparable to that of Davies and Whalley who also ignore leisure.
On-the-job human capital for a person of schooling level S accumulates through the human
capital production function
48(V-3) =As(9)I0SHfj9 + (1 —aS)H,
where the conditions 0 < c < 1 and 0 < 1 guarantee that the problem is concave, and
is the rate of depreciation of skill-S specific human capital. '6" is an ability or heterogeneity
factor, such that different people have different abilities to learn. This functional form is widely
used in both the empirical literature and the literature on human capital accumulation. The c
and 13 are also permitted to be S-specific, which emphasizes that schooling affects the process of
learning on the job in a variety of different ways.
Notably absent from the model are short-run credit constraints that are often featured in
the literature on schooling and human capital accumulation. This model is consistent with the
evidence presented in Cameron and Heckman (1998, 1999) that long-run family factors correlated
with income (the 0 operating through As(O) and the initial condition for (3)) affect schooling, but
that short-term credit constraints are not empirically important. Such long-run factors account
for the empirically well-known correlation between schooling attainment and family income.
At the beginning of life, agents choose the value of S that maximizes lifetime utility:
(V-4) S =Argmax[PV8(O) —Ds+ c]
S
wherePVS (0) is the tax-adjusted present value of lifetime earnings given schooling level 5, tuition
costs are Ds, and E5representsmonetized nonpecuniary benefits of schooling level 5, or else
unobserved components of tuition subsidies (negative costs).27 All values and costs are discounted
27Because of the separation between consumption and investment, the decision to go to school can be formulated
in terms of comparisons among present values of earnings.
49back to t.he beginning of life.
Tuition costs are permitted to change over time so that different cohorts face different schooling
costs. The economy is a.ssumed to be competitive so that the prices of skills and capital services are
determined as derivatives of an aggregate production function. In order to compute service flow
prices for capital and the different types of human capital, it is necessary to construct aggregates
for each of the factors over each of the ability types and over all cohorts to insert into an aggregate
production function.
Post-school human capital of type S is a perfect substitute for post-school human capital of
the same schooling type, whatever the age or experience level of the agent, but it is not perfectly
substitutable with human capital from other schooling levels. In this model, cohorts differ from
each other on'y because they face different price paths and policy environments within their
lifetimes.
The aggregate production function exhibits constant returns to scale. The equilibrium condi-
tions require that marginal products equal pre-tax prices. In the two-skill economy HLT analyze,
the production function at time t is defined over the inputs H, H? and K, where II' and H? are
aggregates of utilized skills (high school and college, respectively) supplied to production, and K
is the aggregate stock of capital. The technology is
a3(a2 (ai()Th+(1— ai)(?))P21 + (1 —
50HLT estimate that P2= 0but Pi.693, which yields an elasticity of substitution between high
school and college human capital of 1.441. HLT explore both open economy (world capital market)
and closed economy versions of their model. The latter produces estimates of aggregates closer to
data from the U.S. economy and I use that version.
Human capital accumulation functions (V-3) are estimated using micro data assuming that
taxes are proportional. However, an extensive sensitivity analysis reveals that within the range
of the data for the U.S. economy, misspecification of the tax system does not affect parameter
estimates if the model is recalibrated on aggregate data. (See Heckman, Lochner, Taber, 1998a,
Appendix B). HLT (1998a) also present an array of sensitivity checks to alternative specifications
of their model and find that their estimates are robust to alternative identifying assumptions. I
now use the HLT model to evaluate the effects of alternative tax policies and tuition policies on
efficiency and distribution.
Tax Effects on Human Capital Accumulation
In the absence of labor supply and direct pecuniary or nonpecuniary costs of human capital
investment, there is no effect of a proportional wage tax on human capital accumulation. Both
marginal returns and costs are scaled down in the same proportion. When untaxed costs or returns
to college are added to the model (i.e. non-pecuniary costs/benefits), proportional taxation is no
longer neutral. An increase in the tax rate decreases college attendance if the net financialbenefit
before taxes is positive. Letting S =1denote college and S =0denote high schooling, a
51person goes to college if PV1 —D'—PV°> 0 where PV denotes discounted (to age 0) earnings.
Progressivity reinforces this effect. A progressive wage tax reduces the incentive to accumulate
skills, since human capital promotes earnings growth and moves persons to higher tax brackets. As
a result, marginal returns on future earnings are reduced more than marginal costs of schooling.
Heckman (1976) notes that in a partial-equilibrium model, proportional taxation of inter-
est income with full deductibility of all borrowing costs reduces the after-tax interest rate and.
hence, promotes human capital accumulation. In a time-separable, representative-agent general-
equilibrium model, the after-tax interest rate is unaffected by the tax policy in steady state as
agents shift to human capital from physical capital (see Trostel 1993). In that framework, flat
taxes with full deductibility have no effect on human capital investment. In a dynamic overlapping
generations model with heterogeneous agents and endogenous skill formation and with progressive
rates, taxes have ambiguous effects on human capital and both their quantitative and qualitative
effects can only be resolved by empirical research. I use the empirically groundel model of HLT
to study alternative proposals for tax reform, their consequences for inequality, and their ability
to construct the policy counterfactuals discussed in Section I.
Analyzing Two Tax Reforms28
Following KSW, I assume that the U.S. income tax can be captured by a progressive tax on
labor income and a flat tax on capital income. Each earner has 1.22 children and is single. For
2Thjs section is based in part on Heckman, Lochner, Taber (1998b).
52each additional dollar beyond $9660, there is an increase in itemized deductions of 7.55 cents. An
individual with labor income Y has taxable income (Y —9660)(1
—.0755).Using the 1995 tax
schedule, the taxes paid on income are computed and approximated by a second order polynomial.
A 0.15 flat tax rate on physical capital is assumed.
Consider two revenue-neutral tax reforms from this benchmark progressive schedule. The first
reform (which I call "Flat Tax") is a revenue-neutral flattening of the tax on labor earnings, holding
the initial flat tax on capital income constant. The second reform ("Flat Consumption Tax") is
a uniform flat tax on consumption. In both flat tax schemes, tuition is not treated as deductible.
(The consequences of making it deductible are discussed below.) For each tax, I consider two
models: (1) a partial-equilibrium model in which skill prices and interest rates are fixed, and (2)
a closed-economy general-equilibrium model where skill prices and interest rates adjust.
A tax policy with universal coverage does not produce natural "comparison" or "control"
groups. For that reason, I do not consider estimates based on methods from the "treatment
effect" literature because that approach is ineffective in this context.
Table 7 presents both partial-equilibrium and general-equilibrium results measured relative to
a benchmark economy with the KSW tax schedule. I first discuss the partial-equilibrium effects
of a move to a "Flat Tax," which eliminates progressivity in wages and stimulates skill formation.
College attendance rises dramatically as the higher earnings associated with college graduation are
no longer taxed away at higher rates. The amount of post-school on-the-job training (OJT) also
53increases for each skill group (as measured by the stocks of human capital per worker of each skill).
The aggregate stock of high school human capital declines while the aggregate stock of college
human capital increases as a result of the rise in college enrollment. The college-high schoolwage
differential increases slightly as does another widely used measure of inequality -thestandard
deviation of log wages. The effects of the reform on aggregates of consumption and output are
modest at best. However, capital formation is greatly reduced as the tax code now favors human
capital compared to the benchmark economy.
In general equilibrium, the effects of the reform on skill formation are, in general, qualitatively
similar, but they are greatly diminished. The effects on aggregate consumption and output are
weak, as they are in the partial-equilibrium case. Furthermore, the negative effects of the reform
on physical capital are muted, since the return to capital increases. The rise in the after-tax
interest rate chokes off skill investment. Per capita post-school OJT accumulation still increases
for both skill groups, although the increase is dampened compared to the partial-equilibrium case.
Aggregate stocks of both high school and college human capital now rise, since college enroll-
ment increases much less. The distinction between partial equilibrium and general equilibrium is
especially striking for the fraction attending college. In general equilibrium, college attendance
increases only for the most able, whereas in the partial-equilibrium case, it increases for all ability
groups. Changes in skill prices and interest rates virtually offset the removal of the disincentives
of progressive taxes on schooling enrollment. The college-high school wage differential (at 10 years
54of experience) now declines slightly, and the increase in the standard deviation of logwages is less.
The Gini coefficient, which is the preferred measure in modern welfare economics, is ordered in
the same way. By this measure of welfare, flat tax reform is not to be preferred. In generalequi-
librium, the increase in the standard deviation is smaller, because skill prices adjust and because
higher after-tax interest rates flatten wage profiles.
Figure 3 shows how the reform affects the utility of the current generation. It lowers the
overall utility of the least able and the least schooled, and raises the overall utility of the most
able and the most skilled. This is a consequence of the pro-human-capital bias of the tax reform
and the interaction between ability and human capital in producing human capital. On a strict
voting criterion for those in the current generation, the reform would not pass (43% in favor; 57%
against). Evaluated at the final steady state, the reform would not be favored. (See the numbers
in Table 8).
Next, consider a move to a "Flat Consumption Tax." This reform is more pro-capital and is
less favorable to human capital. It raises output, capital and consumption more than a "Flat Tax
reform, and it reduces the aggregate stock of high skill human capital and the stock of human
capital per worker for each skill group. The fraction attending college declines. The reform raises
wage inequality as measured by the college-high school wage premium but lowers it as measured
by the standard deviation of log wages, and in terms of the Gini coefficient.
In general equilibrium, this reform is slightly less favorable to human capital formation than the
55"Flat Tax," since the after-tax rate of return on capital risesmore. College attendance increases
slightly, but the increase is concentrated among the least and most ablepersons. Wage inequality
increases slightly by both conventional measures. Realwages rise for both skill groups, and the
rise is greater than in the "Flat Tax" reform. This is due toa larger increase in capital under
proportional consumption taxation. Since capital is a direct complement with both forms of human
capital, and there is no evidence of skill bias in this complementarity relationship, the increase in
capital raises skill prices about equally for both skill groups. The greater increase in realwages
in this case is not due to a larger increase inper capita human capital accumulation within skill
groups.
Figure 4 reveals that across ability and schooling groups, the consumption tax reform produces
more winners among contemporary voters than does the flat tax reform. On a voting criterion,
the consumption reform would be barely favored (52% in favor; 48% against).Comparing steady
states, the reform would be passed by a substantial majority.
When deductibility of tuition is introduced in both reforms, and revenue neutrality is preserved,
there is virtually no effect on skill formation (or anything else) in general equilibrium. This is
consistent with Heckman, Lochrier and Taber (1998b) and the analysis presented below which
shows that general-equilibrium effects of tuition subsidies are small. The lessons from partial-
equilibrium analyses are substantially misleading guides in analyzing the effects of tax and tuition
policy on skill formation. Changes to proportional taxation are unlikely to have large effects on
56skill formation or output. A change to a flat consumption tax has the largest effect on.output.
consumption, and real wages, but it also slightly raises wage inequality. These conclusions also
hold for open economy simulations in which tifeinterestrate is set in world markets. (Heckman,
Lochner and Taber, 1999). They are robust to a variety of tax schedules and empirically grounded
parameter estimates. However, the welfare criteria disagree. On the basis of a voting criterion, the
switch to a consumption tax would be preferred. On the basis of the "Veil of Ignorance" evaluation
criterion applied to steady states population it would not be.29 I now turn to an analysis of tuition
policy.
B. General-equililbrium Treatment Effects: A Study of Tuition Policy
This section of the paper uses the general equilibrium model developed by HLT to consider
the effects of changes in tuition on schooling and earnings, accounting for general-equilibrium
effects on skill prices and considering how the reform would be evaluated under different criteria.
The typical microeconometric evaluation estimates the response of college enrollment to tuition
variation using geographically dispersed cross-sections of individuals facing different tuition rates.
These estimates are then used to determine how subsidies to tuition will raise enrollment. The
impact of tuition policies on earnings is evaluated using a schooling-earnings relationship fit on
pre-intervention data which does not account for the effects of anticipated skill price changes on
29Recall that second order stochastic dominance and Gini ranking are equivalent. See Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1970).
57enrollment and on the job training decisions or the response to the taxes raised to finance the
tuition subsidy. Kane (1994) exemplifies this approach.
The danger in this widely used practice is that what is true for policies affecting a small
number of individuals need not be true for policies that affect the economy at large. A national
tuition-reduction policy that stimulates substantial college enrollment will likely compress skill
prices, as advocates of the policy claim. However, agents who account for these changes will not
enroll in school at the levels calculated from conventional procedures which ignore the impact of
the induced enrollment on earnings. As a result, standard policy evaluation practices are likely
to be misleading about the effects of tuition policy on schooling attainment and wage inequality.
The empirical question is how misleading? Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998c) show that
these practices lead to estimates of enrollment responses that are ten times larger than the long-
run general-equilibrium effects. HLT also improve on current practice in the treatment effects
literature by considering both the gross benefits of the program and the tax costs of financing the
treatment as borne by different groups.
Evaluating the general-equilibrium effects of a national tuition policy requires more information
than the tuition-enrollment parameter that is the centerpiece of partial-equilibrium policy analysis.
v1ost policy proposals extrapolate well outside the range of known experience and ignore the effects
of induced changes in skill quantities on skill prices. I apply the closed economy general-equilibrium
framework to evaluate tuition policies that attempt to increase college enrollment.
58Conventional Models of Treatment Effects
As noted in Section IL the standard frame)vork for microeconometric program evaluation is
partial equilibrium in character. For a given individual j y'1 is defined to be the outcome the
individual receives if he participates in the program, and Y° is the outcome he receives if he
does not participate. The treatment effect for person i is z =— /O Wheninterventions
have general-equilibrium consequences, these effects depend on who else is treated and the market
interaction between the treated and the untreated.
To see the problems that arise in the standard framework, consider instituting a national
tuition policy. In this case, Y° is person i's wage if he does not attend college, and Y' is his wage
if he does attend. The "parameter" z. then represents the impact of college, and it can be used to
estimate the impact of tuition policies on wages. It is a constant, or policy-invariant, parameter
only if wages (Y°, Y') are invariant to the number of college and high school graduates in the
economy.
In a general-equilibrium setting, an increase in tuition increases the number of individuals who
attend college, which in tarn decreases the relative wages of college attendees. In this case, the
program not only impacts the wages of individuals who are induced to move by the program, but
it also has an impact on the wages of those who do not. For two reasons, then, the "treatment
effect" framework is inadequate. First, the parameters of interest depend on who in the economy is
"treated" and who is not. Second, these parameters do not measure the full impact of the program.
59For example, increasing tuition subsidies may increase the earnings of uneducated individuals who
do not take advantage of the subsidy. To pay for the subsidy, the highly educated would be taxed
and this may affect their investment behavior: Additional educated workers enter the market as
a result of the policy, depressing the earnings of other college graduates. Conventional methods
ignore the effect of the policy on nonparticipants. In order to account for this effect, it is necessary
to conduct a general-equilibrium analysis.
Exploring Increases in Tuition Subsidies in a
General-Equilibmum Model
Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998c) simulate the effects of a revenue-neutral $500 increase
in tuition subsidy (financed by a proportional tax) on enrollment in college and wage inequality
starting from our baseline economy described in the previous section. The partial-equilibrium
model predicts an increase in college attendance of 5.3 percent in the new steady state. This is
in the range of effects reported by Kane (1994) and Cameron and Heckman (1999). This analysis
holds skill prices, and therefore college and high school wage rates, fixed —atypical assumption
in microeconomic 'treatment effect" analyses of tuition policies.
When the policy is evaluated in a general-equilibrium model, the estimated effect falls to 0.49
percent. Because the college-high school wage ratio falls as more individuals attend college, the
returus to college are less than when the wage ratio is held fixed. Rational agents understand
this effect of the tuition policy on skill prices and adjust their college-going behavior accordingly.
60Policy analysis of the type offered in the "treatment effect" literature ignores the responses of
rational agents to the policies being evaluated. There is substantial attenuation of the effects of
tuition policy on capital and the stocks of the different skills in our model. Simulating the effects
of this policy under a number of additional alternative assumptions about the parameters of the
economic model, including analysis of a case where tuition costs rise with enrollment, reproduces
the basic result of substantial partial-equilibrium effects and much weaker general-equilibrium
effects.
The steady state results are long-run effects. When HLT simulate the model with rational
expectations. the short-run enrollment effects are also very small, as agents anticipate the effects
of the policy on skill prices and calculate that there is little gain from attending college at higher
rates. When they simulate using myopic expectations, the short-run enrollment effects are much
closer to the estimated partial-equilibrium effects. Of course, the steady state results are not
affected and are large under either myopic or rational expectations. All of these results are
qualitatively robust to the choice of different tax schedules. Progressive tax schedules choke off
skill investment and lead to even lower enrollment responses in general equilibrium. Using the Gini
coefficient. as a measure of welfare, both partial-equilibrium and general-equilibrium simulations
suggest that the reform is welfare improving. In general equilibrium, the overall variance of log
wages is reduced.
Next consider the impact of a policy change on discounted earnings and utility. Decompose the
61total effects into benefits and costs, including tax costs for each group. Table 9 compares outcomes
in two steady states: (a) the benchmark steady state and (b) the steady state associated with
the new tuition policy. Given that the estimated schooling response to a $500 subsidy is small,
we instead use an extremely high $5,000 subsidy for the purpose of exploring general-equilibrium
effects. The rows High School -HighSchool report the changes in a variety of outcome measures
for those persons who would be in high school mder the benchmark or new policy regime; the
High School -Collegerows report the changes in the same measures for high school students in
the benchmark who are induced to attend college only by the new policy; College -HighSchool
outcomes refer to those persons in college in the benchmark economy who only attend high school
after the new policy is put in place; and so forth.
By the measure of the present value of earnings (column 3), some of those induced to change
are worse off. Contrary to the monotonicity assumption built into the LATE parameter of Imbens
and Angrist (1994), defined in this context as the effect of tuition change on the earnings of those
induced to go to college, HLT find that the tuition policy produces a two-way flow. Some people
who would have attended college in the benchmark regime no longer do so. The rest of society
also is affected by the policy—again, contrary to the implicit assumption built into LATE that
only those who change status are affected by the policy. People who would have gone to college
without the policy and continue to do so after the policy are financially worse off for two reasons:
(a) the price of their skill is depressed and (b) they must pay higher taxes to finance the policy.
62However, they now receive a tuition subsidy and for this reason, on net, they are better off both
financially and in terms of utility. Those who would abstain from attending college in both steady
states are also better off in the second steady state. They pay higher taxes, but their skill becomes
more scarce and their wages rise. Those induced to attend college by the policy are better off in
terms of utility but are not always better off in terms of income. For example, individuals from
ability quartiles 2 and 3 have lower net incomes as a result of the tuition policy; however, their
utility rises due to a strong taste for college education. While most groups gain about the same in
ternis of utility, there is substantial variation in the effects on lifetime earnings. Note that neither
category of non-changers is a natural benchmark for a "difference in differences" estimator. The
movement in their wages before and after the policy is due to the policy and cannot be attributed
to a benchmark "trend" that is independent of the policy. The implicit assumptions that justify
the widely used difference in differences estimator do not apply here. The tax system and the
market make the "nontreated" affected by the policy. (See the discussion in Heckman, LaLonde
and Smith, 1999). These conclusions are robust as to whether a closed-economy oropen-economy
model is used. (Heckman. Lochner and Taber, 1999).
C. General-Equilibrium vs. Partial-Equilibrium Approaches
The sharp contrast between the general-equilibrium estimates of program impacts and the
estimates from partial-equilibrium approaches highlights the potential benefit of applying the
general-equilibrium approach to conduct evaluations. Not only is the general-equilibrium approach
63appropriate for the evaluation of programs with economy-wide effects, it also offers an economically
interpretable evaluation of a policy, As discussed in Appendix A, many of the parameters estimated
in the micro_economic "treatment effect" literature, are not those required for the cost-benefit
evaluations.
Critics of the general-equilibrium approach dismiss it because it is based on "questionable"
empirical foundations. They ignore, or trivialize, the use of economic theory to produce counter-
factual policy states, and they assume that empirically credible general-equilibrium models are
not possible to construct. Careless calibration exercises often used to produce empirical estimates
for general equilibrium models have called the entire enterprise of using applied general equi-
librium as a tool for policy evaluation into question. Reacting to this casual empiricism, many
microeconomists dismiss the general enterprise as an empirically unfounded exercise built on weak
foundations.
These criticisms ignore the emerging field of empirically grounded general-equilibrium theory
that unites microevidence, macro time series and general-equilibrium theory to produce credible
parameter estimates of models to evaluate counterfactual states. Browning, Hansen and Heckman
(1999) summarize current developments in this field and present an agenda for research in unit-
ing micro evidence with macro general-equilibrium models. The empirical analysis presented in
Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998a) uses micro data and macro data to estimate the dynamic
general-equilibrium model that is used to present the counterfactual simulations reported in this
64paper.
There is, no doubt, much room for improvement in producing the empirical foundations used
in general-equilibrium models. At the same time, there is room for substantial improvement in the
micro "treatment effect" literature that entirely ignores the general-equilibrium consequences of
the policies it evaluates. Even if the estimated general-equilibrium effects presented here are scaled
down by 50%, they are still substantial. An evaluation literature that ignores price adjustment,
and the investment responses to price adjustment, is likely to err substantially in forecasting policy
impacts.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
Diversity, heterogeneity and involuntary redistribution are the defining features of the modern
welfare state. Disagreements over outcomes and their valuation gives rise to the demand for
publicly justified evaluations of social programs.
This paper critically examines the main criteria proposed in the modern literature in welfare
economics, in the theory of policy evaluation in macroeconomics, and in cost-benefit analysis.
Cost-benefit analysis and macro policy evaluation ignore distributional features of policies treat-
ing heterogeneity of program impacts as either uninteresting or empirically irrelevant. Modern
welfare economics explicitly recognizes heterogeneity in outcomes but focuses on one measure of
alternative policies because of its "ethical correctness". All of the measures proposed in the mod-
ern literature on welfare economics ignore or deplore self-interested agents who evaluate policies
65by comparing their initial positions under current policies with their positions under proposed
alternative policies. A measure that enumerates gainers or losers and quantifying the magnitudes
of their losses comes closer to capturing the information useful in a modern democracy thana
criterion based on axioms of correct behavior that assume that positions in the distribution of
outcomes are independent across policies or that any such dependence should be ignored and that
persons (or their elected agents) ignore their initial position in evaluating policies.
This paper considers the information required to implement the various criteria and how dif-
ferent evaluation methods obtain them. Cost-benefit and "treatment effect" approaches ignore
general-equilibrium considerations, which are also left implicit in the approach of modern welfare
economics. General equilibrium is center stage in the macro policy evaluation model. Virtually
all methods ignore the heterogeneity in program impacts that is a major source of demand for
evaluations in the welfare state.
Using data from an influential social experiment, I demonstrate that heterogeneity in program
outcomes is an empirically important feature of the data even after conditioning on the observed
characteristics. Combining micro and macro data, I draw on my work with Lochner and Taber
to develop an empirically based general-equilibrium model of human capital accumulation that
can be used to analyze the consequences of heterogeneity and diversity for the evaluation of social
programs. The benefits of this approach are examined in evaluating several proposed tax reforms
and in evaluating a proposed tuition policy.
66Accounting for heterogeneity, diversity and general equilibrium has important implications
for the way we evaluate social policies. An evaluation criterion that countsgainers and losers
produces a very different asssesment of the suitability of policies than the "ethically correct"
criteria advocated in modern welfare economics, and one that is more closely attuned to the
requirements of positive political economy.
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73</ref_section>Appendix A
The Relationship Between The Requirements of Cost-Benefit Analysis and The
Information Produced From Social Experiments and The Microeconometric
"Treatment Effect" Literature
In this appendix I relate the parameters estimated in the micro-econometric evaluation lit-
erature or the literature on social experiments to the parameters needed to perform cost-benefit
analysis. I follow the literature in cost-benefit analysis and assume that the policy being evaluated
has a voluntary component and that valid evaluations of a policy can be derived from looking at
the impact of the policy on self-selected participants and nonparticipants.
I postulate the following framework. For a given program associated with policy j,thereare two
discrete outcomes corresponding to direct receipt of treatment (D3 =1,for program participation)
or not (D =0),and a set of program intensity variablesdefinedunder policy jthataffect
outcomes in the two states and the allocation of persons to "treatment" or nontreatment. The
program intensity variablesmay be discrete or continuous. Policy "0" is a no-intervention
benchmark with program intensity y.
Assuming that costless lump-sum transfers are possible, that a single social welfare function
governs the distribution of resources and that prices reflect true opportunity costs,traditional cost-
benefit analysis (see, e.g.,Harberger(1971) or Boadway and Bruce (1984)) seeks to determine the
impact of programs on the total output of society. Efficiency becomes the paramount criterion in
this framework, with the distributional concerns assumed to be taken care of through lump sum
transfers and taxes. In this framework, impacts on total output, as in the evaluation criterion
(1-3), are the only objects of interest in evaluating policies.
For policy j let Y and Y be individual output for person i in the direct participation (D1 =1)
and direct non-participation (D3 =0)state, respectively. The vector of program intensity variables
operates on all persons within the context of program j,althoughits effect need not be uniform.
It determines, in part, participation in the program. One may write D() as the indicator for
participating in program jwhenprogram intensity is .Tosimplify notation I keep implicit
any conditioning on personal characteristics that may affectboth participation and outcomes. I
define c3() asthe social cost ofdenominated in units of output. In general, policies could be
designed for specific persons but we do not consider that possibility here. I assume that c (0) =0
and that cisconvex and increasing in .Thevaluedefines another benchmark policy, "0", in
which there is no program and therefore no participants. This policy has associated cost function
When 0, there might be effects of policy jonoutput that distinguish that policy from the
no policy regime "0". A law that is universally assented to and accepted may raise output at no
cost (e.g.,adoptinga convention about driving on the right hand side of the road). Outputcould
be different in a policy without the law (policy "0") but the direct costs of enforcement would be
74the same under both policies.
Letting N1(,o) be the number of direct program participants and N0() be the rest of the
population, the total output of society under policy jatprogram intensity levelis
=O,3)—c(),
whereN1() +N0()=Nisthe total number of persons in society. ""appearstwice in
the conditioning arguments: as a determinant of Dandas a determinant of the output levels in
the different states. Vector p is general enough to include financial incentive variables as well as
mandates that assign persons to a particular treatment state. Recall that I keep conditioning on
personal characteristics implicit.
Assume for simplicity the differentiability of the treatment choice and mean outcome functions
and further assume thatis a scalar, a simplifying assumption that is easily relaxed. The change








Thefirst term arises from the change in the number of participants induced by the policy change.
The second and third terms arise from changes in output among participants and nonparticipants
induced by the policy change. The fourth term is the marginal direct output cost of the change
in the intensity of policy
In principle, this measure could be estimated from time-series data on the change in aggregate
GNP occurring after the policy intensity parameter is varied. Under the assumption of a well-
defined social welfare function with interior solutions and the additional assumption that prices
are constant at initial values, an increase in GNP at base period prices raises socialwelfare.'
If marginal program intensity changes under policy regime j have no effect on intra-sector
mean output, the bracketed expressions in the second and third terms are zero. In this case,the
parameters of interest are:
'See, e.g.,Laffont(1989, p. 155), or the comprehensive discussion in Chipman and Moore (1976).
75ON1 (o) thenumber of people induced into
3pj program jbythe change in
(ii) E (y1ID(.) =1,)
— E(°ID3(y)= o) themean output difference between
participants and nonparticipants.
(iii) c() thedirect social marginal cost of policy
jatprogram intensity level
It is revealing that nowhere on this list are the parameters that receive the most attention in
the micro econometric policy evaluation literature or the literature on social experiments. (See,
e.g.,Heckmanand Robb, 1985, 1986 or Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999). These are:
(a) E (}'' —}'PD(co) = 1,)Theeffect of "treatment on the treated" for persons
in regime jatpolicy intensity
(b)E ('7
— = where= sets N1(t) =N.This is the effect of
universal direct participation in program 3compared
to universal nonparticipation in 3atlevel of program
intensity .
(c)E (y — Theeffect of randomly selecting a single person for direct
treatment and forcing their compliance with this treatment
compared to their position in the no participation state
under policy jatprogram intensity level p3.
Parameter (ii) can be obtained from simple mean differences between the treated and the
nontreated. No adjustment for selection bias is required. Parameter (i) can be obtained from
knowledge of the net movement of persons into or out of direct participation in the program in
response to the policy change, something usually not measured in micro policy evaluations orsocial
experiments (for discussions of this problem, see Moffitt, 1992 or Heckman, 1992). Parameter (iii)
can be obtained from cost data. It should include full social costs of the program, including the
welfare cost of raising public funds, although these are often ignored.
It is informative to place additional structure on this model. This leads to a representation
of a criterion that is widely used in the literature on microeconomic program evaluation and
also establishes a link with the discrete choice literature in econometrics. Assume a binary choice
random utility framework like that used in the Roy model. Suppose that under policy regime 3with
program intensity level p agents make choices to directly participate or notbased on net utility
76and that policies affect participant utility through an additively-separable term, k(,o), that is
assumed scalar and differentiable. Net utility from participating in the program is U3 = X+k(),
where k is monotonic inand where the joint distributions of (', X) and (°, X) are F(y', X)
and F(y?, X), respectively.2 In the special case of the Roy model, X =Y31—Y° and k =0.In




•Nf Yfk( f( y+Nf:y0fk3)f(Y0,xIdxdY0—().
Understandard conditions, one may differentiate under the integral sign to obtain the following
expression for the marginal change in output with respect to a change in intensity parameters
within policy regime j:
M()=
Nk' ()f(_k ())[E(7D()=1,X =—k(),) — E(°D(ç)= 0,X = —k (cj)
- Of(y',xI) -k(.Of +N fff y' f() dxdy' + f y° f
dxdYo]
— c(),
wheref, the marginal density of X, is evaluated at X = —k(ço3).
This model has a well-defined marginal entry condition: X ￿ —k(). The first set of terms
corresponds to the gain arising from the movement of persons at the margin (the term in brack-
ets) weighted by the proportion of the population at the margin, f(—k()), times the number
of people in the population. This term is the net gain from switching from nonparticipant to par-
ticipant status. The expression in brackets in the first term is a limit form of the "local average
treatment effect" of Imbens and Angrist (1994). This term is estimated in Aakvik, Heckman and
Vytlacil (1998) and further analyzed in Heckman and Vytlacil (1999). The second set of terms is
the within-treatment-status change in output resulting from the change in the program intensity
parameter. This term is ignored in many microeconomic evaluation studies. It describes how
people who do not switch their participation status are affected by the policy change. The third
term is the direct marginal social cost of the policy change, which is rarely estimated. At a social
planner's optimum, M() = 0, provided standard second order conditions are satisfied. Marginal
benefit should equal the marginal cost. Either a cost-based measure of marginal benefit or a
2These are assumed to be absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure.
77benefit-based measure of cost can be used to evaluate the marginal gains or costs of the change in
policy intensity.
Observe that the local average treatment effect is simply the effect of treatment on the treated




Theproof of this resuft is immediate once it is recognized that the set X =—k(cp3)is the indif-
ference set for this problem. Thus, the LATE parameter is a marginal version of the conventional
"treatment on the treated" evaluation parameter for gross outcomes. This parameter is but one
of the three ingredients required to produce an evaluation of social welfare under the cost-benefit
criterion.
The conventional evaluation parameter "treatment on the treated"
E(7
—°lD() =
producedin the microeconometric program evaluation or from social experiments does not incor-
porate costs, does not correspond to a marginal change and includes the effect of intramarginal
changes. This parameter is in general inappropriate for evaluating the effect of a policy change
on GNP. If model (A) of Section III is true, however, then treatment on the treated is the same
as the average treatment effect and it is correct economic parameter for conducting a cost-benefit
analysis. Under certain conditions which I now make precise, the treatment on the treated para-
meter is sometimes informative about the gross gain accruing to the economy from the existence
of program jatlevelcompared to the alternative of shutting it down and switching to policy
"0". The social cost associated with policy "0" is co(0), which we assume is zero: co(p0) =0.
The essential condition is assumption (A-i) in Section II.
The appropriate criterion for an all or nothing evaluation of a policy at levelis
=
{N1()E(hID()= + N0 ()E (°jD() = o,)
—c ()}
—NE(YoI0).
In the no policy regime. there is only one output Y0 and everyone is in the "no program" state.
If A() >0,total output is increased by establishing program jatlevel .Inthe special case
where the outcome in the nonparticipation state under regime j,Y°,is the same as the outcome
in the no-program state (Y0) both for participants and nonparticipants under regime j,wehave
(AA-1) E(P D() =0,)=E(Y0D() =0,)
and
78(AA-2) E(Y° D() =1,)= E(Y0D() =1,).
Theright hand sides of both expressions describe hypothetical conditional expectations. The
right hand side of (AA-i) is what the outcome in the no-program state would be for persons
who do not directly participate in the program under policy jwithparameters ,i.e.,those for
whom D) ()= 0.The right hand side of (AA-2) is the corresponding expression for persons
who would participate in the program under policy jwithintensity parameters ,i.e.,those
for whom D3() =1.These conditioning statements select out, respectively, non-participants
and participants in policy regime jandcompute the expected values of output in the policy "0"
regime.
Assuming that the probability of participation in regime junderprogram intensity level
does not depend on the value of p in the no-program state:
(A-2) Pr (D =iI, ) = Pr(D =
underassumption (A-i) we may use the law of iterated expectations to write
E(Y°)=
E(YoD()= = =0,o)Pr(D() =0).
From (AA-1) and (AA-2) and (A-2) one obtains
E(Y°t,O)=
E(Y3PD() =1,)Pr(D(cc)=1)+E(}PD() =0,o) Pr(D =0
Substituting for E(Y3°)inthe expression for A(), we obtain
(AA-3) A(co) =N(cc)E(}' =l,)
which vindicates the use of the parameter "treatment on the treated" as an evaluation parameter
in the case in which there are no general equilibrium effects in the sense of assumption (A-i).
This important case is applicable to small-scale social programs with partial participation. For
evaluating the effect of "fine-tuning" the intensity levels of existing policies, measure M() is more
appropriate. Neither parameter captures the distributional consequences of the policy change.
As a matter of practice the treatment effect literature focuses its exclusion attention on gross
gains and rarely measures the full costs of the program it evaluates. Beckman and Smith (1998)
demonstrate the empirical importance of adjusting for costs in evaluating job training programs.
Accounting for full costs substantially revises the estimates of the returns.
79Appendix B
The data analyzed in Sections III and IV of this paper were gathered as part of an experimental
evaluation of the training programs financed under Title IT-A of the Job Training Partnership Act
(JTPA). The experiment was conducted at a sample of sixteen JTPA training centers around the
country. Data were gathered on JTPA applicants randomly assigned to either a treatment group
allowed access to JTPA training services or a control group denied access to JTPA services for 18
months. Random assignment covered some or all of the period from November 1987 to September
1989 at each center. A total of 20,601 persons were randomly assigned.
Follow-up interviews were conducted with each person in the experimental sample during
the period from 12-24 months after random assignment. This interview gathered information
on employment, earnings, participation in government transfer programs, schooling, and training
during the period after random assignment. The response rate for this survey was around 84
percent. The sample used here includes only those adult women who (1) had a follow-up interview
scheduled at least 18 months after random assignment, (2) responded to the survey, and (3) had
useable earnings information for the 18 months after random assignment.
The sample was chosen to match that used in the 18-month experimental impact study by
Bloom, et.al. (1993). As in that report, the earnings measure is the sum of self-reported earnings
during the 18-months after random assignment. This earnings sum is constructed from survey
questions about the length, hours per week, and rate of pay on each job held during this period.
Outlying values for the earnings sum are replaced by imputed values as in the impact report.
However, imputed earnings values used in the report for adult female non-respondents are not
used. For a more complete description of this data, see Heckman and Smith (1998) or Heckman,

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ESTIMATED PARAMETERS OF THE IMPACT DISTRIBUTION
PERFECT POSITIVE DEPENDENCEPOSLTIVE DEPENDENCE WITH r =0.95,
INDEPENDENCE AND PERFECT NEGATIVE DEPENDENCE CASES
National JTPA Study 18 Month Impact Sample
Adult Females
Perfect Perfect
Positive Positive Independence Negative
Dependence Dependence of Y' and Y° Dependence
Statistic (r =1.0) with r =0.95 (r =0.0) (r =-1.0)
5th Percentile 0.00 0.00 -18098.50 -22350.00
(47.50) (360.18) (630.73) (547.17)
25th Percentile 572.00 125.50 -6043.00 -11755.00
(232.90) (124.60) (300.47) (411.83)
50th Percentile 864.00 616.00 0.00 580.00
(269.26) (280.19) (163.17) (389.51)
75th Percentile 966.00 867.00 7388.50 12791.00
(305.74) (272.60) (263.25) (253.18)
95th Percentile 2003.00 1415.50 19413.25 23351.00
(543.03) (391.51) (423.63) (341.41)
Percent Positive 100.00 96,00 54.00 52.00
(1.60) (3.88) (1.11) (0.81)
ImpactStdDev 1857.75 6005.96 12879.21 16432.43
(480.17) (776.14) (259.24) (265.88)
Outcome Correlation 0.9903 0.7885 -0.0147 -0.6592
(0.0048) (0.0402) (0.0106) (0.0184)TABLE 3
RANDOM COEFFICIENT AND DECONVOLUTION ESTIMATES
IMPACT ON EARNINGS IN THE 18 MONTHS AFTER RANDOM ASSIGNMENT




Analysis Impact Std Dev Positive
Random coefficient model 601.74 2271.00 60.45
(201.63) (1812.90)
Deconvolution 614.00 1675.00 56.35TABLE 4
TESTS OF SECOND ORDER STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE OF
EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENT GROUP OVER EXPERIMENTAL CONTROL
GROUP EARNINGS IN THE 18 MONTHS AFTER RANDOM ASSIGNMENT
National JTPA Study 18 Month Impact Sample
Earnings Adult Adult Male Female
Value (cx) Males Females Youth Youth
2,500 0.8836 1.0296 -0.3357 0.6674
(0.3162) (0.2978) (0.4250) (0.5094)
[0.0052] [0.0005] [0.4296] [0.1901]
5,000 1.8067 1.9343 -1.0482 0.7137
(0.6582) (0.5955) (0.9344) (1.0022)
[0.0061] [0.0012] [0.2620] [0.4764]
7,500 2.3903 2.7811 -1.8742 0.4428
(0.99 83) (0.8933) (1.4610) (1.4507)
[0.0166] [0.0019] [0.1995] [0.7602]
10,000 2.9839 3.7315 -2.8489 0.1308
(1.3334) (1.1504) (1.9790) (1.8486)
[0.0252] [0.00 12] [0.1500] [0.9436]
15,000 4.0191 5.2659 -4.0631 -0.2717
(1.9826) (1.5768) (2.8333) (2.4032)
[0.0435] [0.0008] [0.1516] [0.9100]
20,000 4.4428 6.2660 -5.8554 -0.4484
(2.5434) (1.8551) (3.5386) (2.1750)
[0.0807] [0.0007] [0.0980] [0.86881
25,000 4.6171 7.0279 -6.3804 -0.4503
(2.9192) (1.9980) (4.0905) (2.864 1)
[0.1137] [0.0004] [0.1188] [0.8751]TABLE 5
SELF-ASSESSMENTS OF JTPA IMPACT
EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENT GROUP




Percent who self-report participating: 61.63 68.10 62.6266.29
(0.81)(0.68)(1.29)(1.09)
Percent of self-reported participants with a
positive self-assessment: 62.46 65.21 67.1671.73
(1.04) (0.85)(1.59)(1.29)
Overall percent with positive self-assessments: 38.49 44.41 42.0647.55
(0.81) (0.73) (1.32)(1.16)
Percent of Self-Reported Participants with a Positive Self-Assessment
by Primary Treatment Received
None (dropouts) 48.89 51.44 58.9061.56
(2.07) (1.85)(3.33)(2.79)
Classroom training in occupational skills 74.10 73.47 72.7375.28
(2.15) (1.36) (3.60)(2.30)
On-the-job training at private firm 75.13 78.9071.0075.00
(2.18) (2.14) (4.56)(4.04)
Job search assistance 59.57 59.80 68.0968.94
(2.27)(2.18) (3.94)(4.04)
Basic education 62.96 56.55 70.9778.44
(4.67)(3.84)(4.09)(3.19)
Work experience 66.67 68.75 82.7673.17
(9.83) (5.84) (7.14)(7.01)
Other 58.47 66.40 62.50 77.98








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Closed Economy Effects of Alternative Tax Proposals
General Equilibrium (Steady State) and Partial Equilibrium Effects
Percentage Difference from Progressive Caset
FlatTaxi Flat Cons. Taxi
PEGEPE GE
After Tax Interest Rate 0.001.9617.65 3.31
Skill Price College HC 0.00-1.310.00 3.38
Skill Price HS HC 0.00-0.010.00 4.65
Stock of Physical Capital -15.07 -0.79 86.50 19.55
Stock of College HC 22.412.82 -15.77 1.85
Stock of HS HC -9.940.901.88 0.08
Stock of College HC per College Graduate3.042.55-4.08 1.72
Stock of HS HC per HS Graduate 1.841.07-5.23 0.16
Aggregate Output -0.091.1515.76 4.98
Aggregate Consumption -0.080.167.60 3.66
Mean Wage College 3.392.600.12 6.96
Mean Wage HS 2.442.440.25 6.82
Standard Deviation Log Wage 4.091.56-1.94 0.69
College/HS Wage Premium at 10 Yrs Exp*1.92-0.453.10 0.18
Fraction attending college 18.790.26 -12.18 -1.92
Type 1: Fraction Attending College 50.29 -1.25 -42.57 2.14
Type 2: Fraction Attending College 28.50 -5.89 -15.60 -7.88
Type 3: Fraction Attending College 14.13 -6.93 -5.20 -9.56
Type 4: Fraction Attending College 15.276.13 -11.77 7.50
Tpe 1: College HC Gain First 10 Years**5.813.12-7.53 1.51
Type 2: College HC Gain First 10 Years**5.332.86-6.84 1.38
Type 3: College HC Gain First 10 Years**5.603.10-6.70 1.61
Type 4: College HC Gain First 10 Years**6.854.17-6.41 2.56
Type 1: HS HC Gain First 10 Years** 3.421.06-7.79 -0.34
Type 2: HS HG Gain First 10 Years** 4.491.97-7.60 0.46
Type 3: HS HG Gain First 10 Years** 5.362.67-7.62 1.06
Type 4: HS HG Gain First 10 Years** 5.292.5.5-7.95 0.92
Table continues on next pageNotes:
§General equilibrium (GE) effects allow skill prices to change, while partial equilibrium
(PE) effects hold prices constant.
tJ the progressive case we allow for a progressive tax on laborearnings, but assume
a fiat tax on capital at 15%.
In the flat tax regime we hold the tax on capital fixed to thesame level as the
progressive tax, but the tax on labor income is fiat as is calculated to balance the budget
in the new GE steady state. This yields a tax rate on labor income of 7.7%. In the
consumption regime, we tax only consumption at a 10.0% rate, again balancing the budget
in steady states.
*The college -highschool wage premium measures the differences in log mean earnings
between college graduates and high school graduates with ten years of experience.
**These rows present changes in the ratio of human capital at ten years of experience
versus human capital upon entering the labor force.
Source: Heckman, Lochner and Taber, 1999.Table 8A
Votes for Policy Reform in the Initial State and
Outcomes in Final Steady State
Movement to Flat
Income Tax
Final Steady State Utility Gain
High School Ability 1: -0.61 0.27
High School Ability 2: -0.20 0.71
High School Ability 3: 0.09 0.93
High School Ability 4: -0.13 0.78
College Ability 1: -0.53 0.35
College Ability 2: -0.32 0.58
College Ability 3: -0.18 0.72
College Ability 4: 0.23 1.16
Ability 1 -0.57 0.30
Ability 2 -0.28 0.64
Ability 3 -0.03 0.85
Ability 4 0.11 1.05




Votes for Policy Reform in Initial State
with Introduction of Technical Change
and Outcomes in Final Steady State




% in Favor in Initial State 65% 66%
Final SteadyState UtilityGain
High School Ability 1: 0.33 1.07
High School Ability 2: 0.76 1.54
High School Ability 3: 0.99 1.78
High School Ability 4: 0.83 1.61
College Ability 1: 0.48 1.22
College Ability 2: 0.74 1.50
College Ability 3: 0.89 1.66
College Ability 4: 1.39 2.17
Ability 1 0.39 1.13
Ability 2 0.7.5 1.52
Ability 3 0.95 1.71
Ability 4 1.25 2.03Table 9
Simulated Effects of $5000 Tuition Subsidy on Different Groups
Steady State Changes in Present Value of Lifetime Wealth













High School-High School (0.5210) 17.520 6.849 6.849
High School-College (0.023) 9.757 -0.372 14.669
College-High School (0.0003) -37.874 -49.528 -45.408
College-College (0.447) 1.574 -10.233 8.412
Ability Quartile 1
High School-High School (0.844) 14.696 5.673 5.673
High School-College (0.045) 30.587 21.043 36.179
College-High School (0.000) 0.000 0.000 0.000
College-College (0.111) 1.273 -8.271 10.353
Ability Quartile 2
High School-High School (0.689) 18.571 7.269 7.269
High School-College (0.033) -5.356 -15.874 -0.841
College-High School (0.000) 0.000 0.000 0.000
College-College (0.277) 1.308 -9.210 9.428
Ability QuarUe 3
High School-High School (0.446) 20.691 8.181 8.181
High School-College (0.014) -22.046 -33.156 -18.409
College-High School (0.000) 0.000 0.000 0.000
College-College (0.541) 1.4010 -9.6910 8.946
Ability Quartile 4
High School-High School (0.139) 19.286 7.633 7.633
High School-College (0.000) 0.000 0.000 0.000
College-High School (0.001) -37.874 -49.528 -45.408
College-College (0.859) 1.802 -11.152 7.498
(t)Thegroups denote counterfactual groups. For example, the High School-High School group consist.s
of individuals who would not attend college in either steady state, and the High School-College
group would not attend college in the first steady state, but. would in the second, etc.
() Column (1) reports the after-tax present value of earnings in thousands of dollars discounted
using the after-tax interest rate where the tax rate usedforthe second steady state is the base tax rate.
Column (1) reports just the effect. on earnings, column (2) adds the effect. of taxes, column (3)

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Changes in Utility from the Reform in the Current Generation: Flat Tax
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Changes in Utility from the Reform in the Current Generation: Consumption Tax
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Changes in Utility from the Reform in the Current Generation: Consumption Tax
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Fig 6A:Utility Changes from Reform in a Generation Experiencing Tech Change:Cons Tax
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